



Douglas ROBINSON

Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

Editor's Introduction:
The Emergence
of 4EA Cognitive Science
out of Hermeneutics

**Cognition and Hermeneutics:
Convergences in the Study
of Translation**

Douglas Robinson
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Editor's Introduction: The Emergence of 4EA Cognitive Science out of Hermeneutics

Douglas ROBINSON
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

1 First Remarks

Cognitive science has arguably been around since antiquity, in works like Plato's *Meno* and Aristotle's *De anima*, and flourished in Enlightenment rationalism, through the work of René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Pierre Cabanis, and others. But modern cognitive science has come to us in two distinct traditions.

The first, emerging in the 1950s, was computational, based on the premise that the human brain is a meat computer that somehow generates not only thought but what Noam Chomsky (1965) called generative transformations and what Jerry Fodor (1975) called a 'Language Of Thought' (LOT). Many of the pioneers in the development of the theory of computation and then the digital computer were involved in

theorizing the cybernetics of neural functioning and the modeling of neural networks in computer architecture. This first tradition is of no concern to us here.¹

The second tradition, emerging in the 1990s and becoming an extremely widespread and influential interdisciplinary in the new millennium, is the one we highlight in this special issue, as it does issue out of hermeneutics—indirectly, via Husserlian and Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology.² It is generally known as 4EA cognitive science, the four Es for *embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive*, the A for *affective*. Arguably, in fact, the intellectual history from Herder instructing his readers to “feel their way into everything”³ in 1774 (section 2) through Schleiermacher and Dilthey to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to 4EA cognitive science constitutes a kind of em-

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- 1 “Of no concern to us here” does not mean, of course, that computational cognitive science is defunct: “Over the last six decades,” according to one pair of neurocomputationalist authors, “computationalism—in its various classicist, connectionist, and neurocomputational incarnations—has been the mainstream theory of cognition” (Piccinini/Bahar 2013: 454). The authors cited provide a useful overview of those six decades.
 - 2 For a useful history of the emergence of 4EA cognitive science out of phenomenology, see Gallagher/Varela (2003); Gallagher (2004) tracks the emergence of cognitive science out of hermeneutics. I am especially indebted to Gallagher (2004: 162) for the connection between Dilthey’s *Zusammenhang* and Husserl’s *Lebenswelt*.
 - 3 A 30-year-old Herder wrote that in reading a text, in order to *mitzufühlen* (“share in feeling”) the author’s whole soul, you should not track the words alone, but: “gehe in das Zeitalter, in die Himmelsgegend, die ganze Geschichte, fühle dich in alles hinein—nun allein bist du auf dem Wege, das Wort zu verstehen” (Herder 1774/1967: 37)/“go into the age, into the clime, the whole history, feel yourself into everything—only now are you on the way towards understanding the word” (transl. Forster 2002: 292).

bodied, embedded, enactive, and extended bulking up of affect:

- first into das *Gefühl des Fremden* (“the feeling of the foreign”) in Schleiermacher in 1813 (section 2),
- then into a collectivized feeling for the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“nexus of life”) in Dilthey in 1910 (section 3),
- then into a whole felt *Lebenswelt* (“life-world”) in Husserl in 1936 (Section 4),
- then into Merleau-Ponty’s 1961 assertion that things “sont une annexe ou un prolongement d[*u* corps] lui-même, elles sont incrustées dans sa chair, elles font partie de sa définition pleine et le monde est fait de l’étoffe même du corps” (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 19) (“are an annex or prolongation of [the body] itself; they are incrustated into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body,” transl. Dallery 1964: 163) (section 5),
- and on into the affectively experienced embodiment, embeddedness, enactivity, and extendedness of cognition in the 4EA canon around the turn of the millennium (section 5).

In Herder what one feels is only superficially the meaning of a text: actually, more deeply, and more complexly one is feeling the author who wrote the text, his or her affective and attitudinal embodiment in the writing of the text, as channeled primarily by prosody. In Schleiermacher what the target reader of a translation feels is the experience of reading the source text, as simulated by the translator—again, with a series of human bodies lurking behind the series of textual screens, so that what one feels is the translator’s reembodying and reembedding of the source reader’s reembodying of the source author. Reading Schleiermacher backwards from the

perspective of 4EA cognition, one might say that for him the primal scene of translation is embedded and extended embodiment as experienced affectively. In that sense the embodied affective *Nachahmung/Nachbildung* (“simulation”) that the translator builds for the target reader stands in for all the other conceptual innovations in this history. The *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“nexus of life”), the *Lebenswelt* (“life-world”), and the *prolongement d[*u* corps] lui-même* (“prolongation of [the body] itself”) are all simulacra, in that they are not physical entities but phenomenological ones; but in another sense they are *not* simulacra, not mere fantasies, because we *feel* them as realities, as *our* reality. The engine driving this history is the Kantian and especially post-Kantian notion that we have no reliable access to the *Ding an sich* (“thing in itself”); what we take to be reality is a social construct. What the German Romantics and post-Romantics added to the Kantian Copernican Hypothesis was the insistence that the force transforming social constructs into realities was feeling, the affect organizing lived experience.

2 The A in 4EA Cognitive Science: Herder and Schleiermacher on Hermeneutical Affect

The founding moment of modern hermeneutics is contested; some attribute it to Friedrich Schleiermacher, others to Wilhelm Dilthey. As Forster (n.d.) argues persuasively, however, Schleiermacher’s pioneering hermeneutical theorization draws heavily from the thought of a very young Johann Gottfried Herder, who in his mid- to late twenties—the late 1760s and early 1770s—was already laying the theoretical ground-

work for German Romanticism.⁴ Certainly if we agree with Roy (1997) and Crouter (2006) that Schleiermacherian hermeneutics is fundamentally feeling-based, the founding moment for that theory came in 1774, when Herder suggested that understanding requires “feeling yourself into everything”:

Ganze Natur der Seele, die durch Alles *herrscht*, die alle übrige Neigungen und Seelenkräfte *nach sich modelt*, noch auch die gleichgültigsten Handlungen *färbet*—um diese mitzufühlen, antworte nicht aus dem Worte, sondern gehe in das Zeitalter, in die Himmelsgegend, die ganze Geschichte, fühle dich in alles hinein—nun allein bist du auf dem Wege, das Wort zu verstehen [...]. (Herder 1774/1967: 37)

The whole nature of the soul, which *rules* through everything, which *models* all other inclinations and forces of the soul *in accordance with itself*, and in addition *colors* even the most indifferent actions—in order to share in feeling this, do not answer on the basis of the word but go into the age, into the clime, the whole history, feel yourself into everything—only now are you on the way towards understanding the word. (Transl. Forster 2002: 292)

In order *mitzufühlen* (“to share in feeling”) the whole nature of an author’s soul, you need *dich in alles hineinzufröheln* (“to feel yourself into everything”). Almost exactly a century after Herder, in 1873, Robert Vischer (1847–1933) would rename and reframe *das Sich-Hineinfröheln* (“the feeling oneself into”) as *die Einfühlung* (“empathy”)—an embodied phenomenology that is sometimes dismissed as prescientific, though since the 1990s there has also been a ‘hard’ empirical branch of brain science called the social neuroscience of empathy.

4 Forster (n.d.) also argues that Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical thought arose out of intelligent and thoughtful engagements with German Protestant theology (especially Johann August Ernesti [1707–1781]) and Jena Romanticism (especially Friedrich Schlegel [1772–1829]).

Those neuropsychologists and neurophysiologists do find empirical evidence of empathic response. But then the social neuroscience of empathy is the empirical study of responses to facial expressions, gestures, and other body language: empathy in face-to-face encounters. Hermeneutics begins as the empathic study of *texts*. Isn't that a problem?

Another potential problem would be that, as Herderian textual hermeneutics is reformulated by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1959, Duke/Forstman 1977a in English), one must not only feel one's way into a text but must "become" the author, "inhabit" the author's mind, and, while writing, also inhabit the mind of the "immediate reader." How does that happen, exactly? Is it some kind of mystical fusion of souls?

A third potential problem is that for both Herder and Schleiermacher, "feeling one's way into" a textual meaning always had to be supported by extensive linguistic, literary, and historical research. The idea was that a research-based understanding of an author's meaning was only possible because the researcher's reading of inert facts on the page was and is guided by the community, through *collectivized* feeling. The reader was to fill in the cognitive gaps left by the affective vagueness of feeling through research based on the guidance provided by communally organized feeling (see Robinson 2013b: ch. 6). Louis Roy's (1997: 217–18) intervention is important:

Throughout his major writings, Schleiermacher consistently uses the word *Gefühl*, "feeling," to characterize prereflective consciousness. For him, *Gefühl* has a meaning different from ordinary feelings such as sensations, emotions, sentiments, or unconscious states, which are often subjectivistic. [...]

In the inner life of the human self, this stable feeling is by no means merely subjective, since it has to do as much with the general (*allgemeine*) as with the individual self-consciousness. By "general," Schleiermacher means that the experience (*Erfahrung*) is "expected of

everyone" (*jedem ... zugebetet*, sec. 3.2). In Henrik Steffens's definition, borrowed by Schleiermacher, feeling is "the immediate presence of the whole, undivided personal experience" (sec. 3.2n). Far from being subjectivistic, this sense of personal existence is always intimately bound up with the awareness of the world and the awareness of God (secs. 30.1, 32.3).

What Roy fails to explain, however, presumably because Schleiermacher can't explain it either, is how being "always intimately bound up with the awareness of the world and the awareness of God" makes "this sense of personal existence" "far from [...] subjectivistic." What exactly is "general (*allgemeine*) [...] self-consciousness"? Calling "undivided personal experience" "the immediate presence of the whole" is really no solution: it just invokes an apparently mystical "immediate presence" without tracking where that "presence" comes from or how it emerges from psychosocial mediation to conjoin a community. Indeed hermeneutical theorists often allude to that "communal" or collective feeling without explanation, presumably on the assumption that we have all experienced it and so do not need to be walked through it; or perhaps because it is such a nebulous preconscious social ecology that theorists find it difficult to trace its contours and trajectories. As a result, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1990, 188–201; transl. Weinsheimer/Marshall 1989, 184–95) famously critiqued Schleiermacherian hermeneutics on the grounds that Schleiermacher had apparently shifted midway through his decades-long process of theorization from a language-based ("grammatical") hermeneutics to a psychological hermeneutics, and "psychological" hermeneutics is mystical mumbo-jumbo.⁵

5 It is in fact quite common for students of twentieth-century hermeneutics simply to take over the "subjectivizing" view of Schleiermacher's late hermeneutics—or even, by extension, of his hermeneutics

In fact there is no evidence that Schleiermacher made any such leap; but neither did he solve the apparent problem, or even recognize the problem. Common sense-based intuition says that people communicate and organize behavior either through language or not at all; “intuitively,” therefore, Gadamer must be right. The subtraction of verbal communication from the hermeneutical equation must leave mysticism as the only “explanation.”

In some sense the two-century intellectual history that I track here from Herder and Schleiermacher through Dilthey to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and on finally to 4EA cognitive science is a concerted attempt to solve the *hows* of Herderian/Schleiermacherian hermeneutics. How is affect communalized? How does that communalized affect stabilize hermeneutical situations—the research-based events where the reader is expected to feel his or her way into the writer’s intention and the writer is expected to feel her or his way into the reader’s interpretation—and how does that stabilization facilitate reliable interpersonal and intergroup communication?

Setting aside that problematic for now, in the expectation that we will see a solution take shape over the course of this Introduction, let us turn to the specific strategies Schleiermacher proposed for translators—strategies that are grounded in that larger socioaffective framework that remained nebulous in his mind, and might have taken on greater clarity in his 1813 Academy address on the different methods of translating had he worked out the full vision, but

tout court—from Kimmerle (1959; transl. Duke/Forstman 1977b) and/or Gadamer (1960; transl. Weinsheimer/Marshall 1989) and present it as the truth about Schleiermacher; see e.g. DiCenso (1990: 83–85).

that are still worth a look in advance of the full hermeneutical-becoming-phenomenological-becoming-cognitivist history.

Everyone knows the general trajectory of the Academy address, of course, in its movement toward the binary choice between “bringing the author to the reader” (bad) and “taking the reader to the author” (good) (see Schleiermacher 1813/2002: 74; transl. Robinson 1997/2014: 229), since that is what Lawrence Venuti (1995: 20) has popularized with the terms “domesticating” and “foreignizing,” respectively. What that popular story misses, however, is the specific *feeling*-based hermeneutical strategies that Schleiermacher outlines.

The basic situation in and through which the need for those strategies arises is that the translator is tasked with mediating between the affective-becoming-conative-becoming-cognitive (attempted) stabilizations of understanding effected by *two* communities—the source culture and the target culture—and that those stabilizations inevitably diverge and conflict. Schleiermacher’s solution to that problem in his Academy address is that the target-textual representation of the source-cultural stabilization is only a feeling-based *Nachahmung/Nachbildung* (“simulation”) (Schleiermacher 1813/2002: 76 in German, Robinson 1997/2014: 230 in English). Target readers should *feel* as if they were participating in a source-cultural stabilization, but they aren’t, and can’t be—at least not through the target text alone. They’re participating in a target-cultural hermeneutical stabilization that simulates a source-cultural hermeneutical stabilization.

A foreignizing translation is one kind of simulation, with a simulated *Gefühl des Fremden* (“Feeling of the Foreign”) mixed in as the hermeneutical norm; a domesticating translation is another kind of simulation, with an overwhelmingly local flavor that is equally simulated and equally normativized, though in the opposite direction. Schleiermacher’s idea is that

what the foreignizing translator simulates for (and ideally in) the target reader is the *Gefühl* (“feeling”) a non-native source reader has of reading the source text with only a mediocre command of the source language (Schleiermacher 1813/2002: 78; Robinson 1997/2014: 231): to that sort of reader, the source text always *feels foreign*, and so the simulated reproduction of that text in the target language should feel foreign as well. What the domesticating translator simulates, by contrast—though Schleiermacher condemns this latter simulation in extreme, illogical, and even hysterical ways⁶—is the *Gefühl* (“feeling”) the polyglot has in reading the same source text: to that sort of reader, the source language always *feels familiar*, and so the simulated reproduction of the source text feels comfortably familiar as well.

The argumentative trajectory through Schleiermacher’s Academy address that lays the groundwork for the A in a 4EA cognitive science of translation, in other words, runs from (1) the socioaffective stabilization of communication (mutual understanding through reliable intending and interpreting) in two cultures, the domestic and the foreign, and (2) the translator’s simulation for and in the target reader of the affective responses various non-native source-reader types have to the source text, to (3) the binary choice between domesticating and foreignizing. The almost exclusive focus on (3) in discussions of Schleiermacher over the past few decades has tended to occlude (1) and (2) almost entirely; but then Schleiermacher himself only mentions (2) in passing, and deals with (1) only in the vaguest possible terms. My *Schleiermacher’s Icoses* (Robinson 2013b) is an attempt to outline

6 See Robinson (2013b: ch. 2) for a close reading of Schleiermacher’s “extreme, illogical, and even hysterical” attacks on domesticating translation.

(and critique) the entire trajectory; but that discussion lacked the two-century aftermath that I'll be tracking here.

3 A Collectivized A and a First Step Toward One or More Es in 4EA: Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens*

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) was the renowned holder of Hegel's chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin (1883–1908) and the nineteenth century's premier advocate of Schleiermacherian hermeneutics. Some even regard him as the founder of modern hermeneutics, since by the 1860s Schleiermacher was largely forgotten and Dilthey recovered and revived his work. (He was Schleiermacher's first biographer and editor of his letters.) Dilthey's hermeneutical project, to which he devoted his entire academic career, was a complex all-fronts theorization of the philosophy of the humanities, based on the lived experiential subjectivity of historically embedded and embodied hermeneuts (all of us). That collectively organized and narrativized body of lived experience was what Dilthey called *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus of life"). It might be assimilated to German Romantic thinking of 'culture' or to post-Kantian thinking of social constructivism—but the phenomenological formation and structure that he elaborates for the *Lebenszusammenhang*, while here and there a bit clunky, was extraordinarily influential for Edmund Husserl and his student Martin Heidegger, and, as we'll see in my article at the end of the special issue, for Walter Benjamin as well.

Complex and tensile as it is conceptually, Dilthey's *Zusammenhang des Lebens* is crippled by the traditional dualistic thinking of subject and object and of the spiritual and the physical. The most radical (and influential) part of the treatise

is Part III, titled “Plan for the Continuation of the Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences” (transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002), which begins with a series of “Drafts for a Critique of Historical Reason.” This is the first paragraph:

Der Zusammenhang der geistigen Welt geht im Subjekt auf, und es ist die Bewegung des Geistes bis zur Bestimmung des Bedeutungszusammenhanges dieser Welt, welche die einzelnen logischen Vorgänge miteinander verbindet. So ist einerseits diese geistige Welt die Schöpfung des auffassenden Subjektes, andererseits aber ist die Bewegung des Geistes darauf gerichtet, ein objektives Wissen in ihr zu erreichen. So treten wir nun dem Problem gegenüber, wie der Aufbau der geistigen Welt im Subjekt ein Wissen der geistigen Wirklichkeit möglich mache. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 191)

The nexus [M/O: “connectedness”] of the world of human spirit dawns in the subject and yet there is a progression of spirit that connects the particular logical processes whereby the overall meaning of this world is determined. On the one hand, this world of spirit is the creation of the apprehending subject; on the other hand, there is a progression of spirit directed at an objective knowledge of the world. Thus we confront the problem of how the formation of the world in the subject makes possible the knowledge of spiritual reality. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 213; my modification)

On the one hand, spirit and subjectivity; on the other, logical determinations of the meaning of the world and objective knowledge of the world. His insistent concern is to distinguish the humanities—in German the *Geisteswissenschaften*, or “spiritual sciences”—from the natural sciences; the spiritual sciences not only study spirit but are guided by spirit—not a divine spirit but the human spirit. (*Geist* can also mean “mind” and “ghost.”) Put differently, the nexus of the spiritual or mental world (*der Zusammenhang der geistigen Welt*) pervades the nexus of life (*der Zusammenhang des Lebens*), which is the organized socially constructed world that interests and fuels the humanities; there is also a *Zusammenhang* or nexus of the physical world, which pervades the natural sciences. He

doesn't expressly label the latter a *Zusammenhang des Totes* ("nexus of death"); but it is clear that spirit is equated strongly with life, and the natural sciences study things lacking in that spirit. (Biology studies living things, but tends to study them reductivistically, reducing them to mechanisms.)

And yet, as he says, there is also a "Bewegung des Geistes darauf gerichtet, ein objektives Wissen in ihr zu erreichen" ("a progression of spirit directed at an objective knowledge of the world"). In what sense is that humanistic knowledge of the world to achieve objectivity? He delves into that project in the next paragraph:

Das Verstehen ist ein Wiederfinden des Ich im Du; der Geist findet sich auf immer höheren Stufen von Zusammenhang wieder; diese Seligkeit des Geistes im Ich, im Du, in jedem Subjekt einer Gemeinschaft, in jedem System der Kultur, schließlich in der Totalität des Geistes und der Universalgeschichte macht das Zusammenwerken der verschiedenen Leistungen in den Geisteswissenschaften möglich. Das Subjekt des Wissens ist hier eins mit einem Gegenstand, und dieser ist auf allen Stufen seiner Objektivierung derselbe. Wenn durch dies Verfahren die Objektivität der im Subjekt geschaffenen geistigen Welt erkannt wird, entsteht die Frage, wieviel dies beitragen kann zur Lösung des Erkenntnisproblems überhaupt. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 191)

Understanding is a rediscovery of the I in the Thou; spirit rediscovers itself at ever higher nexus-levels [M/O: "levels of connectedness"]; this selfsameness of spirit in the I and the Thou, in each subject of a community, in each cultural system, and finally, in the totality of spirit and universal history, makes possible the cooperation of the various functions of the human sciences. The knowing subject is, here, one with its object, and this holds for all stages of its objectification. If, in this way, we can recognize the objectivity of the world of human spirit as created in the subject, then the question arises how much this can contribute to solving the problem of epistemology in general. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 213; my modification)

Der Zusammenhang, which Makkreel/Oman here plausibly translate “connectedness,” is morphologically a “together-hang”; *das Zusammenwirken*, which they equally plausibly translate “cooperation,” is morphologically a “together-working.” Implicit in Dilthey’s repetition of *Zusammen-* “together-” compounds throughout the book is that any one of them can plausibly and usefully be mapped onto any other. Here we can assume that each together-hang (Dilthey’s main keyword in the book) is a together-working. To hang together is to work together. The ‘coherence’ or ‘connectedness’ of the *Zusammenhang* (and both of those are common translations of the German noun) is achieved through working together. I have my own structured psychic nexus, and you have yours; but then as we work together I find my nexus embedded in yours, and you find yours embedded in mine, and our nexuses begin to seem to hang together. The more we work together with others, the more extensive the together-hangs or nexuses become, in the nexus-levels of “this selfsameness of spirit in the I and the Thou, in each subject of a community, in each cultural system, and finally, in the totality of spirit and universal history.” That *Selbigkeit* “selfsameness” makes academic *Zusammenwirken* “cooperation” possible among the various humanistic (inter)disciplines; but it was *Zusammenwirken* “working together” in social circles (including academic ones) that made the levels of the *Zusammenhang* possible in the first place.

Notice there not only the oneness of the subject with its object but Dilthey’s explanation of that oneness in terms of “stages of objectification.” Does that mean, as social-constructivists plausibly tend to say, that our socially constructed world *feels* to us like objective reality? Or does it mean that the subjectivity of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“nexus of life”) and the socially constructed world to which it seems to refer

is a reified phantasm? Surely it doesn't mean that the "spiritual" subjectivity of culture, of social construction, of the humanities as a structured map of reality somehow *becomes* an objectivity, an empirical object such as science studies, or what Kant called *der Ding an sich* ("the thing in itself")? The next three stages in this history, from Husserl through Merleau-Ponty to 4EA cognitive science, would say that 'the subject is one with its object' simply demonstrates the uselessness of the binary discourse of subject and object. Merleau-Ponty will say that "le monde est fait de l'étoffe même du corps" (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 19) ("the world is made of the very stuff of the body," transl. Dallery 1964: 163); 4EA cognitivists will speak of embeddedness and enactivity; all of them are essentially saying that X is one with Y, this with that, but with far more flexibility and mutability than the dualistic discourse of subjects and objects will allow Dilthey. I will recur to the question of what makes a *Zusammenhang des Lebens/Erlebnisses* ("nexus of life/experience") objective or 'factual' in my article in this volume (pp. 243–316).

The spiritual-physical dualism trips him up as well:

Auf dem Boden des Physischen tritt das geistige Leben auf; es ist der Evolution als deren höchste Stufe auf der Erde eingeordnet. Die Bedingungen, unter denen es auftritt, entwickelt die Naturwissenschaft, indem sie in den physischen Phänomenen eine Ordnung nach Gesetzen entdeckt. Unter den phänomenal gegebenen Körpern findet sich der menschliche, und mit ihm ist hier in einer nicht weiter angebbaren Weise das Erleben verbunden. Mit dem Erleben aber treten wir aus der Welt der physischen Phänomene in das Reich der geistigen Wirklichkeit. Es ist der Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften, und die Besinnung über diesen [...] und ihr Erkenntniswert ist ganz unabhängig vom Studium ihrer physischen Bedingungen. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 196)

The life of spirit manifests itself on the base of what is physical and represents the highest evolutionary stage on earth. The conditions under which the life of spirit emerges are developed by natural sci-

ence in that it discovers a lawful order in physical phenomena. The human body appears among other phenomenologically given bodies, but it has a special relation to lived experience that cannot be further specified. With lived experience we move from the world of physical phenomena into the realm of spiritual reality, which is the subject matter of the humanities and of reflection on them [...] The cognitive value of this realm is fully independent of the study of their physical conditions. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 217)

The spiritual-physical binary is of course another version of the mind-body binary, which is another version of the subject-object binary. Dilthey struggles valiantly against the limitations of that dualizing discourse, but with very mixed results. The physical is the base and the spiritual rests on that base, as “the highest evolutionary stage on earth.” The natural sciences study physical bodies and other physical phenomena, and while the spiritual sciences (a literal translation of *die Geisteswissenschaften* “the humanities,” which Makkreel/Oman misleadingly translate “the human sciences”⁷) study the hu-

7 Makkreel/Rodi (2002: 4), as editors of the English translations of the three parts of Dilthey’s *Aufbau/Formation*, opine that “the human sciences include both the humanities and the social sciences, and each provides the opportunity to study human behavior, interaction, and cooperation up close. Some human sciences such as psychology and history are primarily descriptive; others such as economics and sociology are more systematic.” I would disagree here. “The human sciences” are loosely affiliated with the humanities, but draw their empirical methodology from the natural sciences, especially evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology, biochemistry, and the neurosciences. Any discipline that uses scientific method to quantify human reality empirically is by definition ruled beyond the pale of *die Geisteswissenschaften* (“the humanities”). History is emphatically one of the humanities, and, to the extent that it is sometimes included among the social sciences, it is a humanistic social science. There is a humanistic psychology (Freud, Skinner), a humanistic sociology (Znaniecki, Goffman, Bourdieu), a humanistic anthropology (Mead, Bateson, Turner), etc. Because the word ‘science’ in English implies

man spirit *and not* the human body, the human body “has a special relation to lived experience that cannot be further specified.” That is just sad. That special relation to lived experience will figure strongly in Husserl’s last work, and even more brilliantly in Merleau-Ponty’s last work, and will be most intricately specified in 4EA cognitive science. Dilthey found himself unable to go there, and unwilling to specify that that special relation could not be further specified *by him*. I will, however, return in passing to this sentence in my contribution to the volume (pp. 243–270), as *nicht weiter angebbare Weise* (“not further specifiable way”) is a kind of negative affordance, like Walter Benjamin’s *unübersetzbar* (“untranslatable”) and *unmittelbar* (“immediable”).

Dilthey’s model is also strongly supported by the *Gefühl*/feeling-based hermeneutics of German Romanticism. Dilthey says specifically that logic and epistemology have for too long been taken to be the foundation of “die Wirklichkeitserkenntnis” (Dilthey 1910/1927: 45) (“the conceptual cognition of reality,” transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 66), and that a hermeneutical rethinking and reframing of that scientific orientation must begin by grasping “die elementaren Operationen, die dem diskursiven Denken voraufliegen” (ibid.: 45) (“the elementary operations that precede discursive thought”; ibid.: 66) as the true foundation of science. Those elementary operations that are “für die logischen Formen bestimmend” (ibid.: 45) (“determinative for the logical forms”; ibid.: 66), he says, would include “Bedingungen aus dem Strukturzusammenhang des gegenständlichen Auffassens, Fühlens und Wollens” (ibid.: 45) (“conditions from the structural nexus of

the use of scientific method, ‘humanistic social science’ seems internally contradictory; *Wissenschaft* in German covers all research methodologies, and should not be reflexibly translated into English as ‘science.’

the objective grasp, of feeling and of willing”; *ibid.*: 66; translation modified). If we were to simplify that formulation and say that the human haptic, affective, and conative orientation to the world conditions what we take to be reality, however, Dilthey would warn that “dagegen ist es ein Doppelsinn des Wortes, wenn wir vom Gefühl der Ähnlichkeit, dem Gefühl der Wirklichkeit reden” (*ibid.*: 47) (“it is an equivocation to speak of a feeling of similarity, a feeling of reality”; *ibid.*: 68). In what follows it becomes clear that he does not mean that the human haptic, affective, and conative orientation to the world *does not* condition what we take to be reality—only that it’s much more complicated than that.

Just how complicated, of course, will become increasingly pressing in the phenomenological ruminations of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and *a fortiori* in 4EA cognitive science; it does seem inescapable here that Dilthey is groping for something like enactive embodiment, and so (as it seems to us in hindsight) gesturing forward to that future formulation. He is himself, however, not quite up to the task. He remains over-committed to an atomistic logic of definition, so that certain phenomena that seem to resemble feelings are not feelings. Awareness of an obligation in the carrying out of a course of action, for example, may *feel* like a feeling, but if it partakes of neither pleasure nor pain it’s not a feeling—even though, he adds tellingly, “so leicht auch aus dem Zusammenhang des Lebens ein solches Gefühl des Schmerzes, der Einschränkung hintritt” (Dilthey 1910/1927: 47) (“such a feeling of pain or of restriction can readily insinuate itself from the nexus of life” (transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 68; translation modified). Given the hermeneutical protophenomenology and indeed protoenactivism of Dilthey’s keyword *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“the nexus of life”), it is unfortunate that Makkreel/Oman opted to translate it here

as “the context of life,” as if it were simply a matter of being alive in a “context”; but Dilthey himself has only barely seized the tail end of an insight that Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and the 4EA cognitivists will develop brilliantly over the century to come. For Dilthey *the individual* feels no pleasure or pain in the *Innewerden* (“reflexive awareness”) of an obligation, so it’s not a feeling—but those feelings can *hintreten* (“step in” or “insinuate themselves” as I’ve translated the verb; Makkreel/Oman have “supervene”) from the *collective* nexus of life, or from Husserl’s life-world. By Merleau-Ponty and 4EA cognitive science, the recognition has dawned that “the world is made of the very stuff of the body” (transl. Dallery 1964: 163)—that it is precisely by interacting with the environment and codetermining its affordances that the individual contributes to the formation of a collective cultural *Zusammenhang des Lebens* “nexus of life.”

That later working-out of Dilthey’s insight would suggest that he is overly bent on distinguishing not only feeling from reflexive awareness but the individual from the life-world:

Und wie hier Innewerden von Gefühl nicht zureichend unterschieden ist, so wird für die Erlebnisse, in denen ein Fremdes, sei es wirklich oder erdichtet, verstanden wird, der Ausdruck Nachfühlen als zu eng verworfen werden müssen: es handelt sich hier vielmehr um ein Nacherleben, in welchem der ganze psychische Zusammenhang eines fremden Daseins von dem Einzelgegebenen aus aufgefaßt wird. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 47)

And because reflexive awareness is not sufficiently distinguished from feeling here, the expression “re-feeling” must be rejected as too narrow for those lived experiences in which another’s state, be it actual or fictitious, is understood. What is involved here is rather a re-experiencing in which the entire psychic nexus of another’s existence is apprehended on the basis of a particular given. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 68-69)

Note the explosive potential there: “die Erlebnisse, in denen ein Fremdes [Gefühl], sei es wirklich oder erdichtet, verstanden wird” refers not just to the lived experiences in which “another’s state” (real or imagined) is understood, as Makkreel/Oman render it, but to the understanding of *any foreign feeling*, any feeling that does not originate in the individual. That could indeed include empathy for another human being—the feeling of another’s affective body state, which, because it is other, and only *sensed* or intuited by the individual, ostensibly doesn’t count as a feeling. We now know, of course, that the mirror neurons in the human brain make that nice line between my feeling and your feeling extraordinarily difficult to draw: feelings tend to ‘flow’ mimetically between and among bodies.

And pay particular attention to the telling parenthetical qualification *sei es wirklich oder erdichtet*, which Makkreel/Oman accurately render “actual or fictitious,” but could also be “real or imagined,” “real or invented,” “real or fabricated,” or even something like “real or poeticized.” The question Dilthey fails to ask is: who is the *Erdichter*? If the *fremdes Gefühl* (“foreign/alien feeling”) is *erdichtet* (“imagined”), who is doing the imagining? Conceivably it could even be an actual *fremder Dichter* (“foreign poet”): you read a poem in a foreign language or in translation and are affected by the feelings it fleshes forth, even though they aren’t real but were invented by the poet (and/or the translator). But of course you are imagining and fabricating them as well. As you read you are participating in the enactive fleshing forth of those feelings.

To my knowledge Dilthey never mentioned his great mentor Schleiermacher’s Academy address on translation, where as we’ve seen the translator is described as involved in a *Nachabmung* or *Nachbildung* of ‘the’ source reader’s experience of the source text, and thus, presumably, of the source

author's *Erdichtung* ("imagination, invention, fabrication") of *fremde Gefühle* ("foreign/alien feelings"). What Dilthey is describing here, however, could plausibly be read as an extension of Schleiermacher's focus on the translator to the target reader, who would thus be understood as participating in a *Nachfühlen* ("re-feeling") or *Nacherleben* ("re-experiencing") of the translator's *Nachahmen/Nachbilden* ("simulating") of those feelings. Engaging that scene through 4EA cognitive science, we might want to reframe it not so much as a series of re-experiencings but as co-experiencing. Or, coming out of the Extended Mind Thesis (Clark/Chalmers 1998; see Robinson 2013b), we might want to reframe it as what Hanna Risku and Florian Windhager (2013/2015) call "extended translation."

Even more radically, in fact, we might identify the *fremdes Gefühl* as co-experienced with the nonhuman environment. In what John Ruskin called "the pathetic fallacy" (1856/1972: n.p.), for example, we may co-experience the cheerful burbling of a brook or the mournful sighing of the pines, 'fallaciously' but all-too-humanly projecting affect onto nonhuman entities. Or, to return to translating and interpreting, the interpreter's work will be shaped in unsuspected ways by co-experiencing the space in which s/he works: the conference interpreter's auditorium, the liaison interpreter's factory floor or city street, or even mournfully sighing pines. The in-house translator's work will be shaped by co-experiencing the workplace, the freelancer's work by the home workspace, or the coffee shop, or the airport gate area, etc. It seems silly to say that we project 'feelings' onto workspaces, of course; but we do co-experience those spaces, and we do feel that shared experience.

Dilthey comes closer to recognizing and theorizing all this later in his section on feeling:

So ist das Gefühl gleichsam das Organ für die Auffassung unserer eigenen wie fremder Individualitäten, ja durch die Einfühlung in die Natur von Eigenheiten derselben, die kein Wissen erreicht. Die dem Wissen unzugängliche Tiefe scheint sich aufzutun in ihm. Auf der Grundlage des gegenständlichen Auffassens vollzieht sich gleichsam eine Wendung in diese Tiefe. Jenes bestimmte vom Gefühl aus den Gegenstand, gleichsam vorwärts dringend ihn zu erreichen; die Gefühle messen inmitten der Wechselwirkung unserer Selbst und der Gegenstände die Kraft unseres Selbst, den Druck der Welt, die Energie der Personen um uns her. (Dilthey 1910/1927: 52–53)

Thus feeling is, as it were, the organ for the grasping of our own and other/foreign individualities and, through empathy with nature, even for the grasping of properties of nature that no knowledge can reach. Depths that are inaccessible to knowledge appear to reveal themselves in feeling. On the basis of objective grasp is effectuated, as it were, a turn into these depths. The grasp determined the object from the perspective of feeling, pressing forward to reach it, as it were; in the midst of the interplay between ourselves and objects, feelings measure the productive force of the self, the pressure of the world, and the energy of the persons around us. (Transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 74; translation modified)

Makkreel/Oman misleadingly render *eine Wendung in diese Tiefe* there as “this turn inwards”; I have retranslated that literally as “a turn into these depths.”⁸ Those depths to which feelings

8 It strikes me that claiming to have “retranslated that literally as ‘a turn into these depths’” may provoke the protest: “how can ‘a turn into these depths’ be a literal translation, when it is completely idiomatic in English?” Yes, occasionally translating a phrase literally produces the closest natural target-language equivalent. It also strikes me that the assumption that an idiomatic translation can’t possibly be literal is conditioned by *der Zusammenhang des Übersetzens* (“the [normative] nexus of translation”). Because it’s so rare, we assume that a literal translation that is also the closest natural equivalent must be impossible—and the slight feeling of unease or discomfort or reluctance that we experience at that apparent cognitive dissonance is a good example of what Dilthey describes as “aus dem Zusammenhang des Lebens ein solches Gefühl des Schmerzes, der Einschränkung hin-

give us access may be in ourselves, but may also be in other people, in nature, and in built spaces. *Die Einfühlung in die Natur* (“empathy with nature”) is a much more empathic account of our felt co-experience with nature than Ruskin’s term “the pathetic fallacy”: sure, logically (and ontologically) it’s fallacious to think that a brook might be cheerful and pines might be mournful, but the empathic co-affective co-experience (“feeling extended”) of nature is a part of the Romantic *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“nexus of life”), and one that might ideally condition a far more sustainable relationship with nature than the Anthropocene—that Enlightenment/neoliberal *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“nexus of life”) based on cold rational utility—has so far proved capable of.

I have also retranslated *das gegenständliche Auffassen*, which in Makkreel/Oman is “objective apprehension,” as “objective grasp.” The objects in question for Dilthey were not stable material objects to be “apprehended” empirically and studied scientifically but centuries of practical knowledge grasped through “common sense.” As is common in English translations of German philosophical works, Makkreel/Oman want to elevate common body-related words like *auffassen* “to grasp” into lofty philosophical terms like “apprehension”; in this case that means stranding other embodied activities, like *vornwärts dringen ihn zu erreichen* (“pressing forward to reach it [the object]”) without necessarily actually laying hands on it, in the easily ignored peripheries of analogy. Reaching into those depths of nature in haptic quest of objects is not only fully embodied but, as the 4EA cognitive scientists will begin saying nearly a century after Dilthey, em-

tritt” (Dilthey 1910/1927: 47) (“such a feeling of pain or of restriction insinuate[ing] itself from the nexus of life,” transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 68; translation modified from “[...] can readily supervene from the context of life”).

bedded and enactive as well; and the reach is explicitly launched *vom Gefühl aus* (“from out of feeling”), which is to say, out of affect.

4 A Second Step Toward the Es in 4EA: Husserl’s *Lebenswelt*

It is well known (see Carr 1986: 56–57 and 74–77) that Dilthey’s 1910 concept of the *Zusammenhang des Lebens* (“nexus of life”) was a primary inspiration for the theorization of *die Lebenswelt* (“the life-world”) in the last major work by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), *Der Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und transzendente Phänomenologie*—written in 1936, first published posthumously in German in 1954, and translated by David Carr in 1970 as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. That monograph is generally taken to be Husserl’s masterwork, and the life-world is its defining keyword, used 300 times in the book. The life-world is the world we all live in, in the phenomenological sense that we experience it together, and bring its “objectivity” into being through intersubjective lived experience. Because human beings are constantly generating the life-world by living (in) it collectively, by sharing the having of it with others, it is a dynamic horizon that changes as we live it and it lives with us.

A longish quotation or two will not only demonstrate the organic *Zusammenhänge* (“connections”) between Dilthey’s *Zusammenhang des Lebens* and 4EA cognitive science but begin to tie together the disparate strands of this history:

So sind wir konkret leiblich, aber nicht nur leiblich, als volle Ich-Subjekte, je als das volle Ich-der-Mensch im Wahrnehmungsfeld u.s.w., und, wie weit immer gefaßt, im Bewußtseinsfeld. Also wie immer Welt als universaler Horizont, als einheitliches Universum der seienden Objekte bewußt ist, wir, je Ich der Mensch und wir

miteinander, gehören als miteinander in der Welt Lebende eben zur Welt, die eben in diesem „Miteinander-leben“ unsere, die uns bewußtseinsmäßig seiend-geltende Welt ist. Wir, als im wachen Weltbewußtsein Lebende, sind ständig aktiv auf dem Grunde der passiven Welthabe, wir sind von da her, von im Bewußtseinsfeld vorgegebenen Objekten affiziert, den oder jenen sind wir, unseren Interessen gemäß, zugewendet, mit ihnen in verschiedenen Weisen aktiv beschäftigt; sie sind in unseren Akten „thematische“ Objekte. Beispielsweise nenne ich das betrachtende Auslegen der Eigenschaftlichkeit des wahrnehmungsmäßig Erscheinenden; oder unser zusammenfassendes, beziehendes, aktiv identifizierendes und unterscheidendes Tun; oder auch unser aktives Bewerten, unser Entwerfen von Vorhaben, uns er handelndes die vorgehabten Wege und Ziele Verwirklichen. (Husserl 1936/1954: 110–11)

Thus we are concretely in the field of perception, etc., and in the field of consciousness, however broadly we may conceive this, through our living body, but not only in this way, as full ego-subjects, each of us as the full-fledged “I-the-human.” Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each “I-the-human” and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this “living together.” We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world; it is from there, by objects pregiven in consciousness, that we are affected; it is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are “thematic” objects. (Carr 1970: 108–9; translation modified slightly)

It is clear there just how much Husserl took from Dilthey. For Husserl being “concretely in the field of perception, etc., and in the field of consciousness, however broadly we may conceive this, through our living body” is very close to what for Dilthey is being in the nexus of life or of lived experience, and there perceiving not empirical objects directly—Kant’s *Ding an sich* “thing in itself”—but *Nachfühlen/Nacherleben*, or what Dilthey elsewhere calls *ein Nachbilden des Schaffens* (1910/

1927: 220), “a simulation/re-creation of creation,” which exists in “the field of consciousness” and is experienced “through our living body.” This also means being “conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent [*einheitliches*] universe of existing objects,” which is to say as *objects existing coherently* (*zusammenhängende Objekte*, as Dilthey would say) not in extrahuman materiality but in our understanding of them. In the same way, for Dilthey “Erlebnis bezeichnet hier jede Art von Verbindung einzelner Erlebnisse in Gegenwart und in Erinnerung” (1910/1927: 221) (“‘lived experience’ designates every kind of linking of specific experiences in the present and in memory,” transl. Makkreel/Oman 2002: 242), and “Ausdruck einen Phantasievorgang, in welchem das Erlebnis hineinscheint in die historisch fortentwickelte Welt der Töne” (*ibid.*: 221) (“‘expression’ designates an imaginative process in which lived experience illuminates the historically evolved world of tones”; *ibid.*: 242). Just as for Dilthey the hermeneutical nexus or intertwining of life is the “autobiographical” phenomenology of the individual’s entire life as experienced historically, so too for Husserl the life-world is the total experience of “each ‘I-the-human’”; and as for Dilthey “das Erlebnis hineinscheint in die historisch fortentwickelte Welt der Töne, in der alle Mittel, Ausdruck zu sein, sich in der historischen Kontinuität der Tradition verbunden ist” (*ibid.*: 221) (“lived experience illuminates the historically evolved world of tones, in which all the ways of being expressive have been connected in the historical continuity of the tradition”; *ibid.*: 242), so too for Husserl, even more explicitly than in Dilthey, “we, [...] all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this ‘living together.’”

There are also hints here of extended and embedded enactivity: “it is from there, by objects pregiven in consciousness, that we are affected; it is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are ‘thematic’ objects.” It’s not quite clear there how those objects *came to be* “pregiven in consciousness”; that is the etiology of enactivity that Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1961/1964; Dallery 1964 in English) will explore in brilliant detail in “Eye and Mind,” and that Varela/Thompson/Rosch (1991) will first theorize as enactivity and Clark/Chalmers (1998) will begin to explore as extended mind (see Robinson 2013a). The 4EA radical embodied cognitive science for which Chemero (2009) advocates would insist that the “we-subjectivity” of which Husserl writes includes not just all humans but our relational engagements with the spaces/places/environment(s) in which we live and function; that is not yet spelled out here, in 1936.

Husserl’s anticipation of embodied embeddedness also seems to hint at affect, at Herderian/Schleiermacherian *Gefühl* (“feeling”), which is always an intensely extended production of two or more living bodies. This returns us via Brian Massumi to Spinoza, who “defined the body in terms of ‘relations of movement and rest.’ He wasn’t referring to actual, extensive movements or stases. He was referring to a body’s *capacity* to enter into relations of movement and rest. This capacity he spoke of as a *power* (or potential) to affect or be affected. The issue, after sensation, perception, and memory, is *affect*” (Massumi 2002: 15). And those “relations of movement and rest” were effectively transitions from one event to the next, which in turn were “accompanied by a variation in capacity” (ibid.), affective shifts in the bodily intensity of the experience of change. Indeed “for Spinoza, the body was one with its transitions” (ibid.). Those transitions are specifically

felt, “experienced” in the sense of being mapped affectively-becoming-cognitively, but mostly nonconsciously.

It’s not quite clear in the Husserl passage, however, whether the “thematics” of this phenomenological organization and mobilization of objects (and “the world”) for and through and as our activity has what Wilhelm Dilthey called *eine Richtung* (1910/1927: 221) (“a directionality,” transl. Makreel/Oman 2002: 241). A follow-up quotation from the next page may make that clearer:

Selbstverständlich gilt das nicht nur für mich, das je einzelne Ich, sondern wir im Miteinanderleben haben Welt im Miteinander vorgegeben, als die für uns seiend-geltende, zu der wir im Miteinander auch, zur Welt als Welt für uns alle, als der in diesem Seinsinn vorgegebenen, gehören. Und als im wachen Leben immerzu fungierend, sind wir auch miteinander fungierend, in mannigfachen Weisen des im Miteinander Betrachtens gemeinsam vorgegebener Objekte, miteinander Denkens, miteinander Bewertens, Vorhabens und Handelns. Hierbei also auch derjenige Wandel der Thematik, in der die irgendwie ständig fungierende Wir-Subjektivität thematisch gegenständlich wird, wobei auch die Akte, in denen sie fungiert, thematisch werden, obschon immer mit einem Rest, der unthematisch, der sozusagen in Anonymität bleibt, nämlich als die für diese Thematik fungierenden Reflexionen. (Husserl 1936/1954: 111)

Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning. Constantly functioning in wakeful life, we also function together, in the manifold ways of considering, together, objects pre-given to us in common, thinking together, valuing, planning, acting together. Here we find also that particular thematic alternation in which the we-subjectivity, somehow constantly functioning, becomes a thematic object, whereby the acts through which it functions also become thematic, though always with a residuum which remains unthematic—remains, so to speak, anonymous—namely, the reflections which are functioning in connection with this theme. (Carr 1970: 109)

A “theme” is a recurring idea or motif; the directionality that Dilthey mentions is a meaningful sequencing of such recurrences, based on the kind of recursive repetition in which the anticipation of events to come brings current events into alignment with the sequence. What Carr translates as a “thematic alternation” in Husserl’s German is *derjenige Wandel der Thematik* (“that change/transformation of the theme”): the only missing element in Husserl’s borrowing from Dilthey’s directionality is the collective imposition of a *coherent sequence* on that *Wandel* (“change/transformation”). A narrativity might in fact be thought of as one type of thematics—a sequenced type. And it is significant there that the collective participatory construction of a life-world not only thematizes objects as meaningfully available for the organization and facilitation (affordance) of action but thematizes the we-subjectivity as well, as meaningfully available for the performance of those thematized acts. As we’ll see in my “Affordances” article, this is very close to Anthony Chemero’s (2009) theorization of affordances as a key relational element in radical embodied cognitive science.

5 A Final Step and Arrival at 4EA Cognition: Maurice Merleau-Ponty on Visuality

The last step in the two-century journey from a 30-year-old Herder in 1774 to the development of 4EA cognitive science in the early 1990s comes in 1961, with the last piece of writing that the great French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) saw in print before he died: “L’œil et l’esprit” (1961/1964), or “Eye and Mind” (transl. Dallery 1964). This long essay—also published in book form in France—is in fact widely considered to be Merleau-Ponty’s most brilliant contribution to the phenomenological thought that three

decades later led to the birth of 4EA cognitive science, as Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1991) developed their theory of enactivism out of Merleau-Ponty's late work in *The Embodied Mind*. To what extent "Eye and Mind" was directly inspired by Husserl's last book is not clear; we do know, however, that Merleau-Ponty read substantial parts of the unpublished *Krisis* manuscript in 1939, the year after the founding phenomenologist's death.

One of the interesting facts about that intellectual trajectory is that in "Eye and Mind" Merleau-Ponty's vision sounds mystical, but as later cognitive scientists develop it, it comes to seem like painfully obvious common sense. For example:

Tout ce que je vois par principe est à ma portée, au moins à la portée de mon regard, relevé sur la carte du « je peux ». Chacune des deux cartes est complète. Le monde visible et celui de mes projets moteurs sont des parties totales du même Être. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 17)

Everything I see is on principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of the "I can." Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 162)

"La carte du « je peux »" ("the map of the 'I can'") is a metaphor for something—but what? Where does that map exist? What is the "Être" ("Being") of which those two worlds are "parties totales" ("total parts")? The key term that Varela/Thompson/Rosch (1991) assign the theory in *The Embodied Mind* is "enactivism," which they explicitly coin in order to "emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela et al. 1991: 9). As Thompson later develops the theory, it is predicated on

the deep continuity of life and mind. Where there is life there is mind, and mind in its most articulated forms belongs to life. Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, and the formal or organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life. More precisely, the *self-organizing* features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. The self-producing or “autopoietic” organization of biological life already implies cognition, and this incipient mind finds sentient expression in the self-organizing dynamics of action, perception, and emotion, as well as in the self-moving flow of time-consciousness.

From this perspective, mental life is also bodily life and is situated in the world. The roots of mental life lie not simply in the brain, but ramify through the body and environment. Our mental lives involve our body and the world beyond the surface membrane of our organism, and therefore cannot be reduced simply to brain processes inside the head. (Thompson 2007: ix)

Strikingly, one can easily arrange a cento of “purple”—apparently mystical—passages from “Eye and Mind” and juxtapose them with passages by cognitive scientists saying almost the exact things a half century later (typically without quoting or even mentioning Merleau-Ponty):

Passage 1:

[Les choses] sont une annexe ou un prolongement d[*u* corps] lui-même, elles sont incrustées dans sa chair, elles font partie de sa définition pleine et le monde est fait de l'étoffe même du corps. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 19)

Things are an annex or prolongation of [the body] itself; they are incrustated into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 163)

By using the term *embodied* we mean to highlight two points: first that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological and cultural context. By using the term *action* we mean to emphasize once again that

sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals; they have also evolved together. (Varela et al. 1991: 172–73)

Asked by Helen Fielding, “If the painter, for Merleau-Ponty, relies solely on vision, then what is the relation of touch to vision for him, and how could a painter achieve a relation between touch and vision that would not forget the flesh?”, Luce Irigaray (2004: 390) replies: “In my opinion, Maurice Merleau-Ponty does not forget only the flesh that precedes vision but also the flesh present in vision. When I talk about the tactile in seeing itself, I try to remember that the flesh intervenes in vision. Our culture has wanted to master life, thus flesh, including through seeing.” This misses the passage I’ve just quoted, according to which “Things are an annex or prolongation of the body itself; they are incrustated into its flesh,” and several others like it:

A quoi bon, quand toute l'affaire est de comprendre que nos *yeux de chair* sont déjà beaucoup plus que des récepteurs pour les lumières, les couleurs et les lignes[?] (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 25; emphasis added)

But how would this help us when the real problem is to understand how it happens that our *fleshy eyes* are already much more than receptors for light rays, colors, and lines? (Transl. Dallery 1964: 165; emphasis added)

Toute technique est « technique du corps ». Elle figure et amplifie la structure métaphysique de notre *chair*. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 33; emphasis added)

Every technique is a “technique of the body.” A technique outlines and amplifies the metaphysical structure of our *flesh*. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 168; emphasis added)

Les peintres ont souvent rêvé sur les miroirs parce que, sous ce « truc mécanique » comme sous celui de la perspective, ils reconnaissent la métamorphose du voyant et du visible, que est la définition de notre *chair* et celle de leur vocation. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 34; emphasis added)

Artists have often mused upon mirrors because beneath this “mechanical trick,” they recognized, just as they did in the case of the trick of perspective, the metamorphosis of seeing and seen which defines both our *flesh* and the painter's vocation. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 168–69; emphasis added)

toute *chair*, et même celle du monde, rayonne hors d'elle-même. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 81; emphasis added)

All *flesh*, and even that of the world, radiates beyond itself. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 186; emphasis added)

But it also misses what cognitive scientists have done with Merleau-Ponty on the embodiment, embeddedness, extend-
edness, enactivity, and affectivity of all cognition. Perhaps that is understandable? The strong focus on embedded embodiment and enactivity in Varela et al. (1991) would seem to point strongly to the tactility that Irigaray (2004) stresses; but in fact Varela and his colleagues don't isolate touch for special consideration among those “sensorimotor capacities” mentioned in the quotation to which this note refers (they discuss “tactile awareness” briefly on p. 55), and Merleau-Ponty's three mentions of touch (including one in Passage 4, below) are all problematically tangential to his theory of vision.⁹

9 For a more intensive engagement with touching and vision, see Jean-Luc Nancy (1992/2008), Rand (1992/2008), Librett (1997), and Derrida's book-length deconstruction *Le toucher*, *Jean-Luc Nancy* (2000), translated into English by Christine Irizarry as *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy* (2005), and Robinson (2023a: 196–211) for discussion.

Passage 2:

Cette extraordinaire empiètement, auquel on ne songe pas assez, interdit de concevoir la vision comme une opération de pensée qui dresserait devant l'esprit un tableau ou une représentation du monde, un monde de l'immanence et de l'idéalité. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 17)

This extraordinary overlapping, which we never give enough thought to, forbids us to conceive of vision as an operation of thought that would set up before the mind a picture or a representation of the world, a world of immanence and of ideality. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 162)

Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems [...] participate in the generation of meaning [...] engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: *they enact a world*. (Di Paolo et al. 2010: 39)

4EA cognitive science, primed by the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions—and, as my borrowings from Brian Massumi suggest, by Baruch Spinoza, who inspired Antonio Damasio (2003) and the somatic-marker hypothesis as well—fights an all-fronts war on the mainstream subject-object binary in Western thought. It's not that the world exists in serene material isolation from organisms and is merely registered by those organisms, and thus that the mental representations stored in the organisms' brains are "subjective" pictures made of immaterial stuff that is radically different from the material stuff it represents; rather, "the world" (aka "natural cognitive systems") works with us, relationally, participatorily, "in the generation of meaning." We are in "the world," part of its natural cognitive systems, and it/they is/are in us. This notion will feature prominently in my "Affordances" article, in the discussion of Anthony Chemero's relational model of affordances in his radical embodied cognitive science.

Passage 3:

Mon mouvement n'est pas une décision d'esprit, un faire absolu, qui décréterait, du fond de la retraite subjective, quelque changement de lieu miraculeusement exécuté dans l'étendue. Il est la suite naturelle et la maturation d'une vision. Je dis d'une chose qu'elle est mue, mais mon corps, lui, *se* meut, mon mouvement *se* déploie. [...] Visible et mobile, mon corps est au nombre des choses, il est l'une d'elles, il est pris dans le tissu du monde et sa cohésion est celle d'une chose. Mais, puisqu'il voit et se meut, il tient les choses en cercle autour de soi [...]. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 18–19)

My movement is not a decision made by the mind, an absolute doing which would decree, from the depths of a subjective retreat, some change of place miraculously executed in extended space. It is the natural consequence and maturation of my vision. I say of a thing that it is moved; but my body moves itself; my movement deploys itself. [...] Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. (Transl. Dallery 1964: 162–63)

It is important to emphasize here that movement is *ontologically irreducible*. With movement, we enter into another order of reality: in classical terms, movement cannot be a mode or an attribute; it is always substantial and necessarily engages the essence of the subject. It is thus not possible to conceive of the movement of animals as something that accrues to them because of their special situation, because of a need, because of something external to their essence. It is quite intrinsic to movement that it does not and cannot arise from something foreign to it; movement is not a mere contingent modality; it is not possible to enter into the sphere of movement if one is not already in it. Of course an empirical movement can start, but that is because it has always already started, because it is preceded by a form of fundamental, constitutive *mobility*, by what we should call a transcendental mobility. We may add that if movement never starts, it never stops, either; so that rest is not a negation of movement, but a constitutive moment of movement. A being that in its essence is movement can no more leave movement than it can enter it. Thus, a being can *move* itself only if it is able to move *itself*, in other words, to bring itself forward within the realm of mobility. A being can enter

into movement empirically only on the condition of being characterized by a fundamental mobility: it *has* a movement only insofar as it *is* in some sense movement. (Barnabas 2010/2014: 89–90)

Merleau-Ponty and Barnabas there are both working to undo the commonsensical (originally Cartesian) dualism whereby I first think of a goal that I want to achieve and then instruct the muscles of my body to move in order to take steps to achieve that goal. The apparent mysticism of assertions like “A being can enter into movement empirically only on the condition of being characterized by a fundamental mobility: it *has* a movement only insofar as it *is* in some sense movement” may remind us of the Laozian *Daodejing* and its principle of 無為 *wuwei* (“without acting”) or 為無為 *weiwuwei* (“acting without acting”). Indeed, as I suggested in *The Dao of Translation* (Robinson 2015: ch. 2), Ritva Hartama-Heinonen’s (2008: 256) “abductive” theory of translation seems implicitly (and apparently unawares) to support a mystical interpretation of Daoist 為無為 *weiwuwei*:

Abduction is, nevertheless, action without effort, and requires *letting* the sign address the mind (*CP* 2.228), or as earlier stated concerning the translator’s part of the contrast, *not* intervening (Gorlée 1994: 222). Abductive thought therefore entails “a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea” (*CP* 4.581), in translating, an “unconditional surrender” to the sign (Gorlée 1994: 194). Characteristic of the descriptions above is also the aspect of finding single solutions to problems. But abduction is an attitude that covers all action and every step, and it is inseparable: a feeling that integrates and permeates, and flows into a habit, that of abductive thought. In this light, translating is not about my thinking and finding and solving; it is about letting thoughts I have create wider alliances. (Ritva Hartama-Heinonen 2008: 256; italics in original)

The unresolved tension in that passage, however, is between “letting *the sign* address the mind” in the beginning of the passage and “letting *thoughts I have* create wider alliances” at the

end. The second sentence, “Abductive thought therefore entails ‘a surrender to the Insistence of an Idea’ (CP 4.581), in translating, an ‘unconditional surrender’ to the sign (Gorlée 1994: 194),” itself enacts that tension: in Peirce, we surrender “to the Insistence of an *Idea*,” but in Hartama-Heinonen’s supervisor Dinda L. Gorlée we surrender “to the *sign*.” Which is it? Do we surrender to something inside us or something outside us? Do we let a subjective orientation “create wider alliances” or let an object in the world “address the mind”? “Unconditional surrender” seems to suggest that source-textual signs are the vitalistic agents that do all the translating, and all the translator has to do is to surrender to the work undertaken by that agency—and indeed that is how Gorlée explicitly frames the situation (see Robinson 2016), and Hartama-Heinonen’s “abductive” theory of translation seems to lean strongly in that direction as well.

But in the 4EA cognitive science proclaimed here in the transition from Merleau-Ponty to Barnabas, and in the relational affordance theory of Anthony Chemero explored in my “Affordances” article, reality lies *in the tension*. We don’t surrender unconditionally to signs, or to anything else “outside” “us”; we work together. The Extended Mind Thesis of Clark/Chalmers (1998) posits the collaboration between the individual and the world, because the world is in us and we are in the world. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, “my body is a thing among things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself” (transl. Dallery 1964: 163). The *Zusammenhang* (“cohesion”) of my body is the cohesion of the “fabric of the world” in which it is “caught”; and even though my body’s ability to move and see tends to *arrange* “things in a circle around itself,” that is a localized perspective, not an ontological hierarchy.

In the purview of 4EA cognitive science, the best line in that passage from Hartama-Heinonen is “But abduction is an attitude that covers all action and every step, and it is inseparable: a feeling that integrates and permeates, and flows into a habit, that of abductive thought.” If “abduction” is understood broadly as finding oneself “caught in the fabric of the world,” that “feeling that integrates and permeates” is embodied, embedded, and extended affect-becoming-mind, and in enacting the world it “flows into a habit, that of abductive thought.” As I pointed out in *The Dao of Translation* (2015: 75, 174–75), that tendency to “flow into a habit” is the interpretation that Roger Ames and David Hall (2003) place on Daoist 無爲 *wuwei* and other 無-*wu* (“without”) forms: it’s not that the individual *declines to act* but that action has become habitual, and so the individual *seems* to act without decision, without volition.¹⁰

One more transitional passage from Merleau-Ponty to 4EA cognitive science:

Passage 4:

[Le corps] est un soi, non par transparence, comme la pensée, qui ne pense quoi que ce soit qu’en l’assimilant, en le constituant, en le transformant en pensée—mais un soi par confusion, narcissisme, inhérence de celui qui voit à ce qu’il voit, de celui qui touche à ce qu’il voit, de celui qui touche à ce qu’il touche, du sentant au senti—un

10 Ironically, Hartama-Heinonen attacks the habit-based Peircean model of translation offered in *Becoming a Translator* (Robinson 1997/2020) as a “straitjacket” (Hartama-Heinonen 2008: 245), because, she says, habit imposes “anti-creative routines” (ibid.: 256). My sense, *pace* Hartama-Heinonen, is that “flow[ing] into a habit, that of abductive thought” temporarily *submerges* creativity in routines without stifling it. The kind of habitualized translation activity that *feels* like “letting the sign address the mind” is still intelligent activity—still both critical and creative.

soi donc qui est pris entre des choses, qui a une face et un dos, un passé et un avenir [...]. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1964: 18–19)

[The body] is a self, not by transparency, like thought, which never thinks anything except by assimilating it, constituting it, transforming it into thought—but a self by confusion, narcissism, inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in the touched, the feeler in the felt—a self, then, that is caught up in things, having a front and a back, a past and a future [...]. (Transl. Dallery and Smith 1993: 124)¹¹

It is this larger proprioceptive system that goes numb in [Leo] Tolstoy [in the journal entry that Viktor Shklovsky quotes in “Искусство как прием” (1925/1929: 11) (“Art as Device,” transl. Robinson 2008: 88), where he can’t remember whether he wiped the dust off a sofa]: he is like Sacks’s [1985: 44–53] Christina [who suffered damage to her proprioceptive system and couldn’t feel her own body] in the sense that he cannot feel his body, but the body that he cannot feel is not the one encased in his skin (which for most of his long life is healthy and athletic) but the social body of ideosomatic regulation, the body politic. He can’t feel the body of other people, the body he shares with other people. Because he cannot feel what they are feeling, he doesn’t know what he himself is feeling; because he doesn’t share collective feelings and because the circulation of meaning and value through the ideosomatic body politic is where *reality* comes from, nothing makes sense to him. This ideosomatic proprioceptive system doesn’t just coach us to act in normative ways, to apply “common sense” or “practical reason” (read: group norms) to every tiny decision we make; it coaches us to see the world through group eyes, to construct our social and natural environments as they have been constructed by the collective. This homeostatic stabilizing effect of millions of minute somatic mimeticisms, this continual dissemination of tiny empathetic regulatory adjustments through the population, is the proverbial glue that holds

11 Michael Smith’s edits in Carleton Dallery’s translation are for the most part relatively light, and I have by and large opted to stick with Dallery’s original translation. Here, however, Dallery’s eye seems to have skipped over “de celui qui touche à ce qu’il touche”: he goes straight from “inherence of the one who sees in that which he sees” to “through inherence of sensing in the sensed” (Dallery 1964: 163).

society together. Not to feel this ideosomatic proprioception is not to feel alive, not to feel real; as Tolstoy himself writes, “If no one had seen or had seen unconsciously, if the whole complex life of many people passes unconsciously, then it is as if that life had never been.” “Seeing” here means being available for the somatic exchange, for mutual visual/somatic modeling, for the reciprocal mimetic observation and simulation of body language that circulates meaning and value; but even when someone is seeing you wipe the furniture, if you don’t *feel* what they are feeling as they see you, they might as well not have been there at all. (Robinson 2008: 107–8)

My ruminations on Tolstoy’s journal remark about the obliterating effect of not remembering whether he wiped the dust off a sofa or not, following on David Bohm’s (1992: 53) musings on “collective/participatory *thinkings and feelings, thoughts and felts*—or what I would prefer to call the *proprioception of the body politic*” (Robinson 2008: 106)—begin to suggest some 4EA unpackings of Merleau-Ponty’s (1961/1964: 18–19) otherwise cryptic remarks on having “a self by confusion, narcissism,” a self by “inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in the touched, the feeler in the felt.” In what sense exactly can the see-er inhere in the seen? As I explain in the final sentence of that long quotation, “‘seeing’ here means being available for the somatic exchange, for mutual visual/somatic modeling, for the reciprocal mimetic observation and simulation of body language that circulates meaning and value”: seeing is collective in the sense that we “*feel* what [others] are feeling as they see [us],” and the circulation of that feeling through the group lends a sense of reality to experience. The “inherence of the see-er in the seen,” one might paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, makes the scene feel real only through the inherence of “the toucher in the touched” and of “the feeler in the felt.”

There are at least two implications to that:

Implication 1. Just as—again, as Bohm (1992: 53) notes—there is a difference between a “thinking” and a “thought,” between the performance of a cognitive action in the present and its retrieval from storage in memory of the past as an *Ausdruck eines Erlebnisses* (“expression of a lived experience”) to guide current/imminent action, so too is there a difference between a “feeling” and a “felt,” between the performance of an affective action in the present and its retrieval from storage in memory of the past to guide (thinking about) current/imminent action.

Implication 2. “Thoughts” and “felts” are collectivized, rendered plausible and therefore “real,” which is to say in my terms *icotized*,¹² through preconscious group vetting in the somatic exchange; and the present-moment action of thinking, touching, and feeling too is constitutive of the “self” only insofar as it is plausibilized by the group. This would be how what Bohm calls “the proprioception of thought” (and “felt”) comes to be undergirded by the proprioception of the body politic, or what I have since come to call regulatory icosis.

6 Where is Translation in All This?

As you will have noticed, translation appears briefly and passingly in those first four sections—in Schleiermacher and Hartama-Heinonen—but what I have mainly tried to do there is to set up a history linking hermeneutics to cognitive science,

12 Icotic theory began to emerge as an extension of somatic theory in early drafts (from about 2009) of what eventually became Robinson (2016a); see also (Robinson 2013b, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, and 2019). Icosis, my coinage from Aristotle's εἰκόσις/*eikōs* (“plausible”), τὰ εἰκόσια/*ta eikōsia* (“the plausibilities”), is the group plausibilization of opinions as “truths” or “realities” or “identities,” by means of the mimetic circulation through the group of somatic response.

as a foundation for the articles in this volume, which will specifically engage the convergences between cognitive translation studies (CTS) and translational hermeneutics (TH).

And indeed the link-ups between specific transitional moments in this introductory history and the TH-CTS convergences are potentially endless. Since I have been working on Walter Benjamin's 1923 essay "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" for my commentary *Translation as a Form* (Robinson 2023b) and another article (Robinson 2022c), as well as my article at the end of this volume, I am particularly attentive to the connectivity between that essay and moments in this history:

- (section 2) Benjamin notes of the relationship between what is intended in the source text and the way it is intended that *Man pflegt dies in der Formel auszudrücken, daß die Worte einen Gefühlston mit sich führen* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 17) ("We tend to formulate this by saying that words carry a feeling-tone," transl. Robinson 2023: 129);
- (section 3) Benjamin tacitly cites Dilthey, without quotation marks or explicit attribution, in saying of the intertwining of the translation with the power of the source text's translatability that *Er darf ein natürlicher genannt werden, und zwar genauer ein Zusammenhang des Lebens* (Benjamin 1923/1972: 10) ("That intertwining can be called natural; more precisely it is an intertwining of life," transl. Robinson 2023c: 36),¹³ and

13 Note that Martin Heidegger also adopted the term *Zusammenhang des Lebens* in the fifth chapter of *Sein und Zeit/Being and Time* (§77). His *magnum opus* was first published in 1927, four years after the publication and six years after the writing of Benjamin's "Aufgabe." Heidegger took the term directly from Dilthey, and used it in roughly the same sense as Dilthey; one year later, in 1928, he was elected Husserl's successor as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg.

- (sections 4 and 5) while Husserl's *Krisis* and Merleau-Ponty's "Eye and Mind" were not published until 14 and 21 years after Benjamin's death, respectively, the concern with what Samuel Weber trenchantly calls *Benjamin's -abilities* (2008)—(un)translatability, (in)communicability, (im)mediability, reproducibility, criticizability, and so on—attributes those -abilities not to the personal skills or capabilities of the individual but, as we'll see in the issue's final paper, to the embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and affective affordances yielded by a larger future-directed phenomenology of life not unlike that fleshed out by Dilthey, and more distantly kin to the thought of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

7 Contributions

The six articles gathered here cover a broad spectrum of convergences between Translational Hermeneutics (TH) and Cognitive Translation Studies (CTS). In a sense the first three explore the actual TH/CTS convergences and the last three explore applications that illustrate those convergences more obliquely; but each also imagines and implements those respective tasks differently.

We begin with Sigrig KUPSCH-LOSEREIT's detailed and methodical comparison of TH with CTS, "Verstehen als Resultat kognitiver Prozesse: Eine konzeptuelle Neuausrichtung der Übersetzungshermeneutik?" ("Understanding as the Result of a Cognitive Process: A Conceptual Realignment of Translational Hermeneutics?"). As that title suggests, Kupsch-Losereit compares the hermeneutic and cognitive science models of text comprehension processes and sees CTS as superior and therefore even as a substitute for TH. While the TH is more humanistically unruly and the CTS

strictly scientific, both models/paradigms can coexist in an eclectic constellation of theories. We therefore speak of a new paradigm of understanding theory that connects them and shows similarities. The differences between them, she suggests, fall into four categories:

- *divergent conceptualizations*: pre-understanding, prejudice, intuition, subjectivity, original, loyalty, equivalence, the merging of horizons in classical TH, alterity, diversity, cultural difference, discursive regularity in more recent TH; inference, scene, frame, visualization, change of focus, displacement, culture-specific prototyping in CTS
- *text/discourse*: the search for the hidden meaning of a text (TH) vs. the study of regularities in and real-world classifications of discourse (CTS)
- *processing of meaning*: passive (TH) vs. active (CTS)
- *procedures of understanding*: intuitive and subjective (TH relies on subjectivity's intuitive ability to grasp connections quickly and holistically) vs. analytical (CTS)

As should be implicitly clear there, Kupsch-Losereit gravitates more strongly in her own work in the direction of CTS, where she mainly highlights Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory.

Next comes Roberto Wu's "Translating Practices: Situated Bodies between Cognition and Expression," which touches briefly on 4EA (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective) cognitive science as a far more humanistic cognitivism than we find in Kupsch-Losereit, and far closer to hermeneutics. Indeed for Wu "4EA cognition theories stress corporeality and affectivity as necessary components of meaning in one's practices," but also, because those practices "are interpretively oriented, as they are founded on one's facticity and are historically directed toward a horizon of possibilities, they should be taken as hermeneutical phe-

nomena.” It’s not quite that 4EA cognitive science *is* hermeneutics; but certainly the convergences between the two amount to a massive overlap. “In this sense,” he adds, “hermeneutics broadens the sense of embodiment, insofar as it encompasses pre-predicative and non-thematic layers of meaning.” Wu is most strongly oriented in his paper toward the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, specifically Heidegger’s strong orientation to situatedness and historicity, but also his “failure to assign a nuclear role to the body.” Wu also argues that “being situated involves historical issues that require an analysis of the structural propagation of dominion and violence”; to that end in his third section he addresses “feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial studies.”

The third article, Masoud POURAHMADALI TOCHAHI’s “Translation Consciousness and Translation-Specific Double Intentionality,” takes the primary convergence between TH and CTS to lie in phenomenology—but unlike sections 3 and 4 of this introduction, which explore phenomenology in roughly that transitional role as it moves from *late* Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, Tochahi focuses his attention on the phenomenological formalism of *early* Husserl. Despite that formalistic focus, his study elucidates the “translation consciousness” of his title, and particularly the “double intentionality” of that consciousness.

The fourth article, “A Cognitivist Risk-Management Approach to Steiner’s Hermeneutic Motion” by Mehrnaz PIROUZNIK, is still interested in the convergences between TH and CTS, but now with a much more specific focus, or a pairing of two specific foci, which suggests that her article might be thought of as the issue’s first “practical application.” She wields risk-management theory as a cognitivist methodology, and brings it to bear on Steiner’s Hermeneutic Motion, in order to ask not only what risks translators might face in each

of Steiner's four moves but how risk-management might be used to explain the four-stage trajectory of Steiner's model.

The fifth article, "Hermeneutics as a Route to Translating Auditory Aspects of Emotion in Silvina Ocampo's Fictional Worlds: An Analysis of 'Okno, el esclavo'" by Silvina KATZ and Séverine HUBSCHER-DAVIDSON, again situates itself in the confluence between TH and CTS, with a focus on the translation of "sound sensations (noise, music, silences)" in literature, and specifically on "emotion-eliciting auditory/kinaesthetic aspects in Silvina Ocampo's haunting short story 'Okno, el esclavo'." Katz and Hubscher-Davidson straddle disciplinary methodologies in their analytical approach to those auditory and kinesthetic phenomena, using both literary close reading and computer-aided qualitative data analysis. They are especially interested in "the story's emotional impact and embodied reader experience" en route to "a deeper understanding of the translator's daunting cognitive and affective task when (re)interpreting the soundscape of Ocampo's atmospheric worlds." "While cognitive translation studies (CTS) may provide insights into this delicate mental processing of sensory information," they note, "translational hermeneutics (TH) can offer useful information regarding the conditions surrounding our understanding of and immersion in a text's sensory dimension."

Finally, my article on "The Affordances of the Translator" closes the issue with a detailed look at cognitive affordance theory as applied to Walter Benjamin's essay "The Task of the Translator" (1923/1972). After a look at Aleksei Procyshyn's article arguing for an affordance-theoretical reading of Benjamin, showing not only that it doesn't quite work but that Procyshyn has hit on the least dynamic of Anthony Chemero's types of affordance theory, I set out first to theorize the most dynamic and then to find a way of applying

it to Benjamin. That takes me first to Benjamin's borrowing of Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutical concept of *der Zusammenhang des Lebens* ("the nexus/intertwining of life") and Edmund Husserl's adaptation of that concept as the basis for his late (posthumously published) theorization of *die Lebenswelt* ("the life-world"), then to Benjamin's celebration of Friedrich Hölderlin's radically etymological-literal translations of Pindar and Sophocles as an exemplar of translational affordances. The result is not exactly a translational affordance that Benjamin articulates, but it is arguably implicit in his championing of Hölderlin's translations of Pindar and Sophocles as "prototypes of their Form."

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