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Translation Consciousness
and Translation-Specific
Double Intentionality

Cognition and Hermeneutics:
Convergences in the Study
of Translation

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Translation Consciousness and Translation-Specific Double Intentionality

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Abstract: Translation as a mental operation follows the same fundamental principle as everything mental, namely intentionality. In translation studies as well as in philosophy, especially in those approaches that are interested in translation issues, we rarely come across an approach that has brought to bear the intentionality in connection with the translation phenomenon and examined it from this point of view. However, the phenomenological study of the translation process shows not only a complex intentional structure of this process, which consists of a collaboration of very different intentional acts, but also a complex structure in which the double intentionality of consciousness plays a crucial role. In this article, I deal with how this intentional structure is designed and how the double intentionality specifically comes into play.

Keywords: Phenomenology of language, Phenomenology of translation, Intentionality of translation, Husserl.

1   Introduction

In his *After Babel*, George Steiner makes the following remark:

> It is worth noting that the development of modern phenomenology has accentuated the areas of overlap between translation theory and general investigation of sense and meaning. The conceptual claims, the idiom of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas force on anyone concerned with the nature of translation a fuller awareness of, a more responsible discomfort at, notions of identity and otherness, of intentionality and signification. When Levinas writes that 'le langage est le dépassement incessant de la Sinngebung par la signification' (significance constantly transcends designation), he comes near to equating all speech-acts with translation in the way indicated at the outset of this study. Phenomenological ontologies look very much like meditations on the 'transportability' of meanings. (Steiner ³1998: 292)

In the midst of his criticism of translation theories, especially those that are universalistic, Steiner refers to Husserl and phenomenology in the quoted passage and emphasizes the achievements of the phenomenological tradition for translation thought. George Steiner actually is one of those who are skeptical about any theorizing efforts in the human sciences on the grounds that standards of verifiability, falsifiability and predictability, which follow scientific theories, have no validity in the human sciences (Steiner ³1998: xv-xvi). Translation theories are no exception in this leveling and harsh criticism of theorisation. Steiner particularly points out that a translation theory in the sense of a mature theory that deals with the conditions of possibility or feasibility of the translation, if it can exist at all, should at least presuppose a systematic theory of language, which, according to him, is not yet given (ibid.: 294).

Regardless of how skeptically the hermeneut Steiner approaches translation theories with his partially legitimate contempt, and how radically he contests any theoretical approach

as "the claims of theory", he does not ignore the achievements of phenomenological philosophy and the specific relevance of the phenomenology of Husserl and its central concept of intentionality for translation thinking. Although with the term "'transportability' of meanings" in the quoted passage he seems to have a critical attitude towards phenomenology as well.

As can be summarized from Steiner's further explanations, a systematic theory of language on the basis of which a possible translation theory can be formulated should accordingly be (1) "An intentionally sharpened, hermeneutically oriented way of designating a working model of *all* meaningful exchanges, of the totality of semantic communication (including Jakobson's intersemiotic translation or 'transmutation')", whereby "the 'totalizing' designation is the more instructive because it argues the fact that all procedures of expressive articulation and interpretative reception are translational, whether intra- or interlingually"; (2) related to a theory of language, because only in this form can it be used with a "systematic adequacy"; and (3) a "mature theory of how translation is possible and how it takes place, of a responsible model of the mental attributes and functions which are involved" (Steiner ³1998: 293–94).

If we go through these three constitutive properties of the ideal theory of translation as prescribed by George Steiner, we find that they can only be achieved by phenomenology as the "theory of theories" (cf. Husserl 1975: 244).[1] And they can be achieved by phenomenology because: (1) phenomenology is an analysis of the being-synthesis, and as such examines this synthetic whole with regard to its constitutive elements including language and linguistic phenomena, inter

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1   All translations from Husserl into English in this article are mine.

alia translation, in the totality horizon of being and does not limit itself to a certain unrelated area. In this respect, phenomenology is the only theory that can develop such a model of all "meaningful exchanges", including intersemiotic ones. (2) Phenomenology examines the whole synthetic being in its intentional relation to consciousness. Consciousness animates being thanks to intentionality and ascribes to being meaning segments or meaning totalities. Linguistic meaning is only possible and understandable as a modality of this general meaning attribution. We therefore have a phenomenological theory of language that is not limited to formal aspects as is the case in linguistics, but is able—and for this it must first be expanded—to explain the translation phenomenon with "systematic adequacy". And (3) the analytics of being goes hand in hand with the analytics of consciousness in its physico-psychic functioning. In this respect, phenomenology is not just a standard philosophy, but a cognitive science that can also study the respective object of investigation from a cognitive point of view and become a bridge between hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences.

One of the most important and urgent tasks of phenomenology as this single omnibus cognitive-hermeneutic science, therefore, consists in identifying the cognitive acts of hermeneutic translation consciousness, which as such is a variant of a general hermeneutic consciousness but nevertheless has its particularities. The nature of this consciousness, like any consciousness in general, is intentional, that is, oriented towards what is to be translated, connecting and absorbing it into consciousness and making consciousness the pole of all translational events. In translation studies as well as in philosophy, especially in those approaches that deal with translation issues, we rarely come across an approach that has made a connection between intentionality and the translation

phenomenon and examined it from this point of view. The study of the translation phenomenon as a mental phenomenon shows, however, a very complex operation of intentional acts. In this process we meet not only a translation-relevant functioning of simple intentionality but also the presence of a translation-specific double intentionality in the sense of a dyadic orientation of consciousness to the main elements of translation.

The aim of this essay is to explain first the intentionality of the complex phenomenon of the translation process based on the translation of a nominal expression—by nominal expression I mean a single expression that names a single object—and second the double intentionality of this process. In order to achieve this, I shall explain what is meant by translation, and I shall especially try to work out an operational concept of translation, i.e. a provisional work definition whose relevance lies in the absence of a universally valid definition for translation. In this regard, I address *translation consciousness* as a translation-specific central topic. To explain how this consciousness works, I shall mostly be referring to Husserl's phenomenology of language insofar as it is relevant to translation issues. I am particularly interested in the ideality of meaning in the sense of its transcendent nature in relation to the factuality of the language and its threefold independence from the physicality of the expression, from the object named by the expression and from all subjective acts that sustain them, and in the problematic relationship between object and nominal expression and the way language works in a life-world reality. I shall then describe the structure of translation consciousness and its intentional acts. This will enable me to demonstrate the double intentionality of translation consciousness. However, since double intentionality as it occurs in the translation process differs radically from the double in-

tentionality that commands objects of perception, i.e. the physical objects, I shall try to clarify the peculiarities of translational double intentionality by analysing the temporality of the translation consciousness.

2   What is translation?

Translation, understood as a primary operation between languages, proves to be a very complex process, determined by numerous factors of different natures, such as linguistic, semiotic, philological, philosophical, cultural, historical, psychological, anthropological and so forth (see Wilss 1977: 60; Steiner [3]1998: 238; Apel/Kopetzki 2003: 12). The complexities of translation can be seen primarily in the variety of the definitions that various authors have long attempted to propose (Koller [8]2011: 76–91). It is beyond the scope of this article to recall these definitions and to study the specificities as well as the inadequacies of each one in order in the end to emphasize the problem of translation as an object of scientific investigation. Therefore, above all we need an operational definition of the translating process, which will temporarily help us in the course of this article and that definition will serve its purpose if it demonstrates the double intentionality of the translation process. Before that, however, it must be clarified that, regardless of how translation has been defined by different authors, what I mean by translation is the operation that takes place between different languages, each one defined as a different genetically constructed system of linguistic representations depending on a specific and delimitable space-temporality. This corresponds to what Roman Jakobson in his famous triadic division of translation calls an "interlingual translation" (Jakobson 1992: 483).

Regardless of all the complications of whatever kind that an interlingual language relationship can entail, translation, so far as it deals with the provisional research objective of this article, i.e. the translation of a nominal expression, means this: a language change in the sense of the relationship between the given expression E in language L and the expression E' in language L'. This relationship can be shown in the first step as follows:

$$E\ (L) \longrightarrow E'\ (L')$$

Figure 1: Basic model of a general translation relationship

The objections that may arise regarding this simple translation relationship alone can be numerous. However, since we are primarily not developing the topic from a purely translation-theoretical point of view and since we are satisfied with an operational conception of the translation process, we do not endeavour to suggest a complete list of all objections that can be raised in this regard. Nor do we intend to provide a detailed answer to all of the objections referred to here.

It can be said that the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') cannot be thought of as a linear one-to-one relationship, however, due to the possible ambiguity in natural languages (e.g. of a lexical, grammatical, syntactic type) (cf. Koller [8]2011: 132–47; Diller/Kornelius 1978: 29f.; Quine 1960: 125ff.). Nor should we take into account the objection that states that the existence of the expression E' (L') is not certain, due to the complications of the different natures just mentioned above (cf. Mounin 1963: 94). A number of further objections may also deal with the problem of different world references, depending on the language in the sense of a different linguistic approach to the world, not to mention the problem of subjectivity as an agent of the translation operation.

As for the first part of the objections regarding the ambiguity question and the non-existence of the E' (L'), we can say: irrespective of how ambiguous an expression is and which relationship-multiplications two potentially ambiguous expressions can assume due to their translation-specific relation, it is certain that a translation-specific relationship-multiplication deriving from the ambiguity is ultimately a set of linear partial relationships between two given expressions. This certainly does not mean that the ambiguity is not important. The ambiguity in the sense of the simultaneous appearance of several possible objects denoted by a single expression or simultaneous appearance of several possible expressions denoted by a single object – the object O simultaneously evokes E1 (L), E2 (L) to En+1 (L), etc. or the expression E evokes O1, O2 and On+1 – and the complications that this situation can cause in a translation process, have their own problems. And since they are also of an intentional nature, they must be explained in a separate phenomenological study. However, we shall only accomplish this after we have discussed and clarified the simple relationship between E (L) and E' (L').

The possible non-existence of E' (L') is also to be understood as the flip side of the question of ambiguity and, as we will see, it does not alter radically the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') or its whole intentional mechanism. Translation is a fundamental subjective or subject-like search for E' (L') once we encounter E (L) for translation purposes, even if E' (L') does not exist. Consciousness of an E' (L')-non-existence, in the sense of searching for an E' (L') on the basis of the evidence of the meaning of the E (L) and realising that the E' (L') does not exist – a special kind of plant, animal, feeling, action, thought, etc. in short: a natural or cultural object for which one language has an expression and another does not – belongs to the intentional consciousness of the

translation process. And it can only be explained in the context of the phenomenological outline of the basic translational mechanism of the translation of E (L) into E' (L'). The only thing that changes is the translation-specific temporality in the sense of a time-related search for E' (L') that may or may not succeed.

As far as the second part of the objections is concerned, we first address the crucial question of the diverse relationship to the world depending on the language. This is discussed in modern philosophy, particularly in Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. His thesis must be considered as the center of his project, namely to contest language- and theory-independent *a priori* truths and to question the identity and the ideality of meaning. This thesis, as we know, consists in levelling criticism at "the almost universal belief that the objective references of terms in radically different languages can be objectively compared" (Quine 1960: 79). This amounts not only to questioning any ideal language-independent meaning, which is to say to "ontological relativity", but also to the idea of the "inscrutability of reference," the indeterminacy of translation (or rather vice versa), and ultimately to contesting the concept of intentionality (ibid.: 221).

We know that Quine later, especially in his work *Pursuit of Truth*, moderates his position on intentionality to the extent that he recognizes the relevance of "intensional" concepts and admits the irreducibility of the mental possibility of ordering physical states (Quine 1990: 71 and 1991: 143–55; Woodruff Smith 1994: 165). At the same time, the phenomenological investigation of Quine's thesis, as I have explored in an as yet unpublished article, shows that there is an indeterminacy of translation also from a phenomenological point of view. What is clearly at stake here is a reciprocal ap-

proach between the two philosophies despite all the contrasts, and this can be very instructive, because it enables a dialogue between two rival philosophies on the problem of translation. In order for this dialogue to occur at its best, we must first reconstruct the phenomenological view of translation. To do this, we must orient ourselves towards intentionality, the very basis of phenomenology, and explore the translation problematic in relation to our intentional consciousness in its holistic, synthetic and embodied nature.

The intentionality of our consciousness, in particular its function in the translation process in the form of double intentionality, turns the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') into a mediate ontological whole, the center of which we shall soon refer to as translation consciousness: the relationship between E (L) and E' (L') does not come about on its own terms, but solely through a purely subjective or subject-like mediation (simulated by algorithms for example) or through any other mediations endowed with intentionality or simulated intentionality (if possible). The relationship outlined above should then be shown as follows:[2]

E (L) ———————→ [ ] ·················▸ E'(L')

Translation
Consciousness

Figure 2: Core working model of the translation consciousness

Before we describe the translation consciousness and the corresponding acts involved and hence address ourselves to

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2   Since the existence of E' (L'), as we admitted above, is not evident (although its non-existence is also not decisive for the completion of the translation process), we have shown the arrow with dots.

double intentionality, let us fitst outline some phenomenological elements relevant to the translation which are at the same time indispensable for further analyses.

3   Ideality of Meaning and its Translation-relevant Threefold Independence

In phenomenological language theory, certain "empty intentions" called "meaning intentions" or "significational intentions" are held responsible for the fact that we create a linguistic expression from a "word complex" or "word phenomenon", which apparently differs in no way from all other appearing objects (see Husserl 1984a: 66, 420; Husserl 1984b: 567). These empty intentions of consciousness are ideas or representations (*Vorstellungen*) by nature, but just empty ideas or representations (cf. Husserl 1987: 13), and they are exactly what defines the essence of "significance" or "meaning".

As far as intentions are concerned, they generally differ according to how they are fulfilled, i.e. the way in which they are fulfilled relative to our intuition. In this regard, one can for example point to the radical difference between "desire" and "volitional intentions" on the one hand and "meaning" and "intuitive intentions", which Husserl also calls "objectifying acts", on the other (see Husserl 1984b: 584). Fulfillment itself is a kind of "intuitional illustration" (*Veranschaulichung*) which makes our empty intention objective: we intend something "in a more or less improper or inadequate way", and then our intention possibly is afterwards filled with a certain intuitive "fullness" (Husserl 1984b: 597). The sensible perception, or better, the "originally given intuition" as "legal source of knowledge" and therefore as the ideal of knowledge, plays a decisive role, so that all possible intentions of meaning, including those of pure thoughts and concepts, are

in search of fulfillment in our sensible perception (see Husserl 1976: 51). If, however, one speaks of objectifying acts – acts that objectify and make up the objects – and more precisely of meaning intentions, the fulfillment has the character of "recognition" or "identification", after our meaning intention tries to be fulfilled in a corresponding intuition and what we only thought and intended in the meaning intention is recognized and identified in our intuition (Husserl 1984b: 584).

A meaning intention, as intention, is nothing more than an intentional "act" (cf. Husserl 1984a: 391–92; Husserl 1976: 74 note 2). Therefore our empty intention or idea, when we direct it to an expression, first makes the expression as an expression understandable for consciousness. Then it allows that expression to be grasped for our consciousness as this precise expression and no other, beyond all its possible manifestations and according to certain typological laws, and ultimately it opens up a horizon of possible fulfillment of meaning.[3] The fact that when we read, hear or see an expression like "the table", we first distinguish the expression as an expression at all, then recognize it as an English word, and finally come to the idea of *desk* and not a *chair*, means that the whole conception is the work of a cooperation between the meaning intention and the meaning fulfillment, which forms a "homogeneous phenomenological unity" (Husserl 1984a: 44).[4] This unity works on the basis of several linguistic-phenomenological peculiarities.

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3   Regarding the "identity of the word" and its "recognition" according to its "type" (cf. Husserl 2005: 117).

4   Throughout this text, by the word in quotation marks I mean the expression and by the word in italics I mean the object that is conscious or meant either in the mode of perception or in the mode of imagination or phantasy.

The first is the word phenomenon. The word phenomenon as the physical side of an expression is a specific phenomenon insofar as, thanks to its phantom-like existence, it has a specific objective function (Husserl 2005: 170). The word phenomenon is the first thing that our intention meets and it is the one that leads our empty intention to the most appropriate fulfillment. However, it is in its objective fate that it must disappear after our intention has come to its true meaningful objectivity. I see or hear the word "table" and then bring my attention to the real *table* that is in my perception field, or to some idea of a table. Once I grasp what is meant by the word table, what is physically pronounced or expressed is no longer important and I am no longer concerned with it. The act that constitutes this phenomenon in what Husserl calls the "word consciousness" or "signitive consciousness" is accordingly a "qualitatively indefinite act" (Husserl 1987: 12), i.e. the word phenomenon appears in consciousness like all other objects, but its mode of appearance is meanwhile modified without any meaning modification in consciousness.

This ghostly transitional function of the real physical (acoustic-graphic) side of the expression, through which the phenomenological reality of the expression merges into the ideal of meaning, means that on the one hand the physical existence or non-existence of the expression loses importance for our consciousness, and on the other hand the appearance place of the physical side of the expression can theoretically vary in the sense that it can sometimes appear in reality in the perception, sometimes in an unreal and immanent fashion, in one's imagination or phantasy (Husserl 1987: 12; also Husserl 2005: 62). It is therefore completely indifferent to our understanding consciousness whether we read a word on paper or just imagine and picture it in our inner thoughts. In this respect, the word phenomenon merely

serves as a "basis" for triggering acts of consciousness and for terminating the intention through the word or signitive consciousness in "meaning consciousness" or "signification-al consciousness" (Husserl 1987: 15).[5]

The liveliness of the expression and its semantic anima-tion, as I have shown, are not possible without the unity be-tween the intention and the fulfillment of meaning, and ac-cordingly between word and meaning consciousness. We se-mantically animate the word through our meaning intention, and the intention is set on the way to a possible fulfillment in which we gain the meaning. Phenomenologically, as indicat-ed, the "originally given intuition" and especially perception as the ideal of knowledge is the goal of adequate fulfillment (see Husserl 1976: 51). For example, the expression "the table" in the sentence "the table is dirty" only has an adequate meaning if the object we name thereby is intuitively present. The strange thing about this situation, however, is that the intuitively present object in our perception alone cannot be understood by itself as the meaning of the expression, since the expression retains its meaning even without this percep-tion. Here one must strictly differentiate between the mean-ing and the object of an expression. Husserl's claim that phe-nomenologically "mere perception is not a meaningful act" should be understood in relation to this distinction (cf. Hus-serl 2005: 5, Husserl 2002: 74). This can particularly be seen in practical cases where a single expression denotes multiple objects ("bank") or where multiple expressions denote a single object ("drink" and "beverage"), all of which differ from expressions that do not refer to any real object at all ("unicorn") (cf. Husserl 1984a: 52–53, 60).

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5   Husserl also describes the meaning consciousness as "thematic con-sciousness" or "consciousness of fulfillment" (1984b: 564; 2005: 204).

The meaning is an ideally identical unity, which in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl calls "matter" (*Materie*) and later in *Ideas I* "Noema" (on matter cf. Husserl 1984a: 413; on the noema cf. Husserl 1976: 299–302). More precisely, matter, the "generalization of the notion of meaning to the field of all acts", and its intentional essence, or the noema, and in particular the center of the noematic core (which Husserl calls the "determinable X"), are the identical meaning (*Gemeintes*) that occurs in every act of our consciousness (i.e. in every perception, every memory, every imagination, every wish, every question, every command, every judgment, etc.) and are to be understood as the linguistic meaning (Husserl 1986: 91; McIntyre/Woodruff Smith 1975: 116; McIntyre/Woodruff Smith 1984: 88; Føllesdal 1982: 74). This specificity of matter or noema as ideal and identical meaning leads to the radical view that the meaning of an expression, regardless of what kind of expression it is , is every time and everywhere an ideal and identical unity. The meaning of an expression can therefore be distinguished from the word phenomenon, from the real object and from all subjective individual acts (such as the acts of perception) which maintain it in different modes of consciousness. The radicalness of this view goes so far that Husserl emphasizes in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that language is in its totality and even in its culture-specific inventory something ideal, although its ideality is constantly ignored (Husserl 1974: 24, 163ff.).

Thus, meaning is defined in the sense of a threefold independence from the word phenomenon, from the real object and from all our individual subjective acts. This state has several translation-theoretical consequences and explains that (1) every translation event takes place away from real linguistic relationships in the ideal consciousness realm, (2) consciousness thereby becomes the location for any translation

possibility or impossibility, (3) a suitable translation theory must be able to research and explain this ideality of the translation process, (4) to do this, it must also be an idealistic theory of consciousness, (5) translation theories that approach the translation problem in a purely formal manner (e.g. in linguistics) can neither examine nor describe the fundamental structure of the mental possibility or impossibility of translation, (6) the fundamental possibility of translation is based on a formal linguistic substitutability due to the threefold ideality of meaning, (7) everything intended to be translated can be theoretically freed from all of the linguistic-psychological-ontological relationships to which it belongs, (8) everything needing to be translated can, in the ideal world of consciousness, be theoretically the object of a translational act of interlingual transmission and thus of a process of translation, (9) subjective acts are not decisive in the basic possibility of translation, since the meaning is independent of subjective acts, (10) subjective acts are decisive in the basic possibility of translation because of (1) and (2), (11) this double determination, this dialectic of power and powerlessness, of ability and inability based on the simultaneous decisiveness and indecisiveness of the subjective acts, constitutes the essence of translational, but also presumably of any interpretive action, (12) the translator does not need to have experienced or recognized the topic to be translated and its subject matter, (13) this lack of reliance on the experience of objects points to the fundamental role of the imagination in translation, (14) meaning in its radical ideal being is like a phantom—it is and it is not—and (15) the translator's job is to paint phantoms and to expose the paintings.

In the sentence "They sat around the table and discussed the incident", it is completely irrelevant how the sentence is acoustically, typographically and typologically given. The first

practical step in translation is to have the sentence repeated in my head. We do not know the people involved in the discussion. We do not know what ethnic-anthropological characteristics they have and how many they are. We do not know either the table they are sitting around or the room they are in. Nor do we know the incident they are discussing. The way they argue with each other and the attitude everyone has are unknown to us. The subjective acts of narratological functioning that made it possible to refer to this state of affairs, and the modality of its subjective appearance and possible variations (whether the whole is seen or thought or both)— all this is unknown to us. We do not know either the logical or the psychological in this state of affairs. And yet we are still able to translate this sentence—in German with something like: "Sie saßen um den Tisch herum und diskutierten über den Vorfall", or in French with: "Ils étaient assis autour de la table et ils discutaient de l'incident".

How does this take place? Where does that come from? The description of this cognitive-mental possibility from a phenomenological point of view and the analysis of the intentional structures that are effective here are of considerable difficulty. The main difficulty consists primarily in the difference in the intentional structure of the translation of a noun and that of a sentence. Based on the current state of my research, I will first go into the intentional structure of the translation of a noun. In the example used, I can thus explain through which intentional performances the translation of "table" or "incident" comes about. I am interested first in the problematic relationship between object and expression, then research the intentional tendencies and the functioning of language in a life-world context, in order to finally describe the intentional structures of translation consciousness and its double intentionality.

4   A Problematic Relation between Object and Nominal Expression

If we return to the functioning of meaning fulfillment and consider the way in which our empty meaning intention sets off on the path to a possible fulfillment, regardless of whether the intention comes to a fully adequate meaning in the sensible intuition or not, the whole process depends on a specific act structure that establishes the relationship between consciousness and its object. If we have a purely formal expression, i.e. an expression that in its formalization process has broken off its relation with the absolute matter (the expression "square root", for example), the meaning of the expression and the meaning intention are one and the same. In the case of an expression in which the expression—"the table" for example—denotes an object that is to be found in the field of perception, our meaning intention searches for its meaningful object in the perceptual field (i.e. in the perception or imagination) in order to achieve the most complete and adequate fulfillment possible. Here the relationship between object and expression is a problematic relationship that requires explanation.

Although in some texts Husserl defends the idea that the relationship between an expression and the meant object is the same in both directions (i.e. from expression to object and from object to expression) (Husserl 2005: 412), in *Logical Investigations* he represents the thesis of a double relationship between expression and object, depending on whether we refer to the object from the expression or the other way around. In this context, he distinguishes between a "static" and a "dynamic" relationship, depending on whether the point of departure is the object or the expression:

Static relationship:

Object   ——————→   Expression

Dynamic relationship:

Expression   ——————→   Object

Figure 3: Static vs. dynamic relationship between expression and object

Overall, if we are dealing with an expression and a sensible object, we have certain sensations on both sides, which on the one hand belong to the "word appearance" and on the other hand to the "object appearance" (Husserl 1984b: 559). Given the ontological differences between the two phenomena, we have an apperceptive act character that objectifies and unifies the two phenomena. In the static relationship, where the point of departure is a sensible object and leads to the appropriate expression, this act is a "cognitional" or "identification act", thanks to which we first recognize the object as this or that object and then as belonging to this or that expression (ibid.: 559). This recognition happens immediately in a static relationship, since the intention, directed at the object, is already fulfilled and no longer strives for fulfillment.

In the dynamic relationship, on the other hand, we first have the symbolic expression, which is only introduced into the process of possible fulfillment through the meaning intention. The meaning intention is an unfulfilled intention of a mere thought, which looks for a "more or less" adequate fulfillment in the intuition and thereby brings about a phenomenological unity that manifests itself in a "consciousness of fulfillment" (Husserl 1984b: 566). Unlike in the static relationship, the objectivity that is merely thought and meant in the expression is visualized in the intuition and the intention

no longer operates directly on the basis of the cognitional act, since we have no object at all and nothing is recognized in symbolic understanding, at least not in the sense of the static relationship. According to these explanations, the difference between the two relationships is a difference between a "process of fulfillment" in the dynamic relationship and a "resting fulfillment" in the static relationship (ibid.: 567–68). We read or hear the word "table" and we have to commit to its fulfillment process until we get to its meaning. That is dynamic. We see the table as an object, we recognize it as a table and immediately as named as a table. This is static.

The unity between expression and object creates a "unity of identity" or a "unity of coincidence" or even, as Husserl later formulates, a "unity of correspondence", whereby the thought and the meant object correspond to the object in the intuition. The cognitional act, which establishes this correspondence and thereby contributes to the constitution of a "consciousness of identity" as a consciousness of identification, rehabilitates as an "act of identity", the "specific intentional correlate" of which is nothing other than the identity between the meant and the real object. But since the intention itself is phenomenologically a "material" or a synthesis of partial intentions, which in turn unite to form the "unity of a total intention", it can also conflict with the intuition. Therefore, instead of a consciousness of identity we have a "consciousness of conflict" based on a "synthesis of conflict" (Husserl 1984b: 571–78). Husserl (2005: 210ff.) later referred to this consciousness in its two variants (consciousness of identity and of conflict) as a "thematic consciousness".

5 Intentional Tendencies and Language Function in Life-World Reality

We still have a long way to go before we begin to see how language works in the *Lebenswelt* "life-world". The question at present is, what changes a life-world reality in this linguistic situation? In a life-world linguistic reality we are not just encountering expressions and objects, and feeling forced for the first time to wait for a cognitional act to be established so that we will know whether this or that object is connected with this or that expression. Also, we do not need to think about whether this or that expression designates this or that object, but everything happens spontaneously, habitually and almost involuntarily. During his period of genetic phenomenology, Husserl deepens his theory of meaning and directs it in a way that allows him to explain this language characteristic as well. In particular, he introduces some fundamental elements, including the term "indicative tendency" (*Hinweistendenz*), which is of absolute importance for answering the above-mentioned question.

The indicative tendency is an "intentional trait", which, according to a simplified definition, starts from expression and ends in the "meant thing" (Husserl 2005: 152–53). An even more precise definition states that the indicative tendency is a "transitional tendency" starting with the accomplishment of the word consciousness and ending in the accomplishment of the thematic consciousness (ibid.: 201). The indicative tendency collaborates with our meaning intention so that, firstly, meaning is preferred in the radical difference between word and meaning. Secondly, the entire transition from expression to meaning occurs associatively when our meaning intention changes from the first to the second. The intentionally merged unity of meaning goes hand in hand

with tendencies. However, the fact that the indicative tenden-cy deriving from a certain expression does not end up in any arbitrary consciousness of meaning, but specifically in a cor-responding consciousness of meaning, means that it is about a "specific" tendency combined with the specific intentional unity between the expression and its meaning. We hear the word "table" or read it, alone or in the middle of a sentence, but we do not stay long in the perceptual phase of the graph-ics or the acoustics, as if we were interested in the aesthetics with which they are designed. We may want to do this for whatever reason. It may be a calligraphic or musical pheno-menon. The merit of meaning as a work of tendency is that something pushes us away from the mere perception of the word "table" and tries to force us to think of and grasp the meaning of the table. But if we want to continue to turn off meaning because we are interested in appearance for some aesthetic reason, we must resist this tendency.

Despite this connection, we should not conclude that the indicative tendency is identical with the semantic unity between the expression and its meaning. The tendency is based on our meaning consciousness (e.g., in the case of am-biguous expressions), but not on the quality of fulfillment in this consciousness (Husserl 2005: 202) and the way of fulfill-ing the tendency is different from that of a meaning intention. It is more "satisfied" or "saturated" than fulfilled in the sense of a search for the intuitive and adequate fullness (ibid.: 36, 139). The indicative tendency is to be understood as a "ten-sion" that tries to relax while the meaning intention is to be fulfilled, which ultimately means that the general form of the unity of meaning and the general form of the tendency are to be distinguished. When we perceive the word "table" we au-tomatically think of a table. Automatically thinking of a table means: the tendency has successfully pushed us away from

the perception of the word and led us to the thought of the table. The meaning intention is fulfilled because we think of the right thing. And since we are thinking of the right thing, the tendency is also saturated and does not move us to keep looking. When we accidentally do not think of the right thing, not only do we know that we are not thinking of the right thing, which is the result of the deception of meaning intention, but we are troubled and motivated to keep searching until we think of the right thing, which is the work of the insatiable tendency.

Despite this difference, however, overall fulfillment is the result of fulfilling the meaning intention on the one hand and saturating the indicative tendency on the other (Husserl 2005: 205). The general scheme is as follows:


Figure 4: General modell of fulifilment of meaning intention and indicative tendency

As far as the relationship of the expression and its meaning is concerned, however, we are not dealing with a single tendency, but with at least two types of tendencies, i.e. the "signitive tendency" and the "thematic tendency". Both of them imply the word consciousness and in connection with our interest—whether directed to the expression as word or to its meaning (for example, for a while we are only interested in the writing and not in the meaning), this also leads to a "con-

flict" (Husserl 2005: 209ff.). We perceive the word "table". A signitive tendency directs our attention to graphic or acoustic of the word "table", while at the same time the thematic tendency leads us to its meaning. The following scheme therefore results:


Figure 5: General modell of fulifillment of meaning intention and indicative tendency including the interaction of two types of tendencies

Although the indicative tendency is to be distinguished from the meaning intention, it is a characteristic of all intentions as such and accordingly of all intentional relationships, and very specifically of associative relationships, according to which "one consciousness pushes onto another consciousness, one is reminiscent of the other, one sets up an expectation of the other" (Husserl 2005: 134).[6] Thus, the indicative tendency as a tendency enabling the transition between different components, with all their ontological differences, is not only attributable to expressions or signs, but also to objects or objectivities in the sense of intentionally thought and meant objects. Indeed, thanks to the empirically and genetically constituted intentional tendencies present in all objectivities, it is possible that the world with all its different components gets itself out

6   "Ein Bewusstes auf ein anderes Bewusstes hindrängt, eins an das andere erinnert, eins das andere erwarten macht" (Husserl 2005: 134).

of a static world and becomes a genetically designed and apperceptive comprehensible whole, the parts of which act like dark matter, which pull us in without making their force structure perceptible. In this respect, it is not only the case that we think of the table due to the tendency structure inherent in the word when perceiving the word "table", but when looking at a table the word "table" comes to mind, which in turn involves the tendency structures inherent in the object, which lead us to the word "table".

It is only through the elaboration and thematisation of tendency structures that we can succeed in going beyond the description of the nature of the language, which Husserl takes to be logical (Husserl 2005: 45), and in describing the language in its functional whole, in its "language habitualness" (*Sprachüblichkeit*) (ibid.: 169ff.) and according to its "concrete unity" of linguistic consciousness (ibid.: 47). What constitutes the concrete unity of linguistic consciousness is exactly what constitutes the essence of language habitualness, namely an "associative unity" through "successive occurrence", after which "the word reminds of the meaning" and "the meaning of the word" (ibid.: 202). The entire functioning of language is accordingly divided between the sometimes logical, sometimes associative function of language, with the possibility of a permanent transition from one to the other. Furthermore, as we will see, this is a crucial step in describing the intentional mechanism of the translation process and its double intentionality.

6   Translation Consciousness and the Intentional Structure of Translation Acts

Translation as a mental activity also follows a possible fluctuation between these two basic language functions. This activ-

ity can also become a language habitualness in the course of successive practice, so that expression E in language L associatively evokes in us its equivalent E' in the language L'. This higher-level linguistic habitualness, which is specifically a translational one, can be considered a variant of a general linguistic habitualness, but cannot be explained by it in the first place, since we can assume that the expression E (L) in its original translational process in the consciousness does not end directly in the E' (L').

We now have the phenomenological conceptual or analytical instruments to venture a phenomenological analysis of an original translation process that takes place in a given consciousness, starting from the simplest case of a nominal expression. The task now is not to speak about a general relationship of equivalence, but rather to elicit the basic functioning of a translation process and its double intentionality. In this context, it is assumed that with the translation operation we try to introduce the nominal expression E (L) into the translation of the expression E' (L').

With the E (L) ("table" for example) we actually have a consciousness, namely a word consciousness, in which our meaning intention pushes us away from the word and leads us to its meaning in the corresponding meaning consciousness. In our meaning consciousness of E (L) occurs a search for the E' (L') ("Tisch"). We have two relations here, which, although they revolve around the meaning of E, of *table*, must not be qualitatively identical, as stated: we have a relationship from expression to meaning in the first part of the whole relationship and a relationship from meaning to expression in the second part. As briefly hinted at earlier, Husserl revises this conception in a text from *Draft Plan for the revision of the 6th Logical Investigation* and tries to neutralize the difference between static and dynamic relationships. In this text, he em-

phasizes the role of a linguistic "recognition", thanks to which the object is not only recognized as a certain object, but recognized in exactly the same way as the corresponding expression designates and means it. According to this revised version, the recognition of the object (*table*) and the meaning of the expression ("table") coincides with the act of recognition or identification, regardless of whether we come to the expression from the object or from the object to the expression, since "apart from the judgment, apart from the existent object that is recognized […] in the expressed knowledge of an object […] everything is one" (Husserl 2005: 412).[7]

Without intending to disagree with this view, we need to proceed in a differentiated manner in relation to the translation process. We have two different qualitative relationships. The specificity of the translation process is that the first relationship dissolves in favor of the second relationship, which does not exist *a priori* in terms of the linguistic standard of a single language. Therefore, the second relationship is temporarily formed to accomplish a new and more comprehensive unity, i.e. a translational unity. The two relationships do not constitute an intentionally merged unity. And, depending on the relationship, we have a separate fulfillment, which can lead to a temporal abnormality and irregularity compared to a linguistic normal case. And by temporal abnormality and irregularity I mean that because of these two separate and not yet intentionally fused relationships and their specific respective fulfillments, translation does not proceed like normal monolingual usage. The possible slowness or stuttering in translation are examples of this temporal abnormality.

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7   "[A]bgesehen von der Beurteilung, abgesehen von dem daseienden Gegenstand, der erkannt wird, ist in der ausdrücklichen Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes alles eins".

When we go from E (L) ("table") to the corresponding consciousness of meaning, where we establish the relationship thanks to the act of recognition, the meant object (*table*) is in the mode of perception (it may well be that the object appears within the field of perception) or imagination. We now know the meaning of the expression. Thanks to the first thematic meaning consciousness, we have the theme (*table*). Also, the meaning intention of E (L) is more or less fulfilled. Consequently, we can assume that we have a dynamic relationship in the first part of the relationship and a static relationship in the second. The scheme is as follows:


Figure 6: Dynamic and static relationship in the translation consciousness

Since the first relationship briefly dissolves in the process of translation to establish the second relationship, and all of this while the meant object (*table*), i.e. the meaning, is recognized, it is difficult to accept an *immediate* establishment of a second act of cognition. In other words it is difficult to accept that we establish immediately the relationship between the recognized meant object (*table*) and the equivalent expression ("Tisch") without any motivation. In some cases (such as in the case where we forget what a certain recognized object is called: "I see a rambutan. I know the plant from my stay in Southeast Asia. It has been a long time since I was there. I see the plant, for example in a photo of me; I recognize the plant; but I can not remember its name, not even in my language."[8] This knowledge is already with us, but does not lead to a corresponding expression because the necessary motivation is

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8   I thank Douglas Robinson for this example.

missing or for some reason is not able to give the appropriate corresponding expression.

Due to the translation-specific transition, we can only establish the second act of cognition if the motivation for this transition is present. The motivation to transition from the accomplishment of the first to the second relationship, from *table* to "Tisch", is indeed possible through a collaboration of different tendencies. In a normal language consciousness, an indicative tendency reaches a state of calm and relaxes after our meaning intention has been fulfilled in the meaning consciousness and the corresponding indicative tendency becomes saturated. By definition, the peculiarity of the translation process is that the mere meaning consciousness and the simple establishment of the fulfillment unity in the output of the expression E (L) are not sufficient, since the *telos* of the translation process lies in the search for the E' (L'). Only through the transposition of the *telos* into a far-reaching *search consciousness*, in which the tendency is not completely saturated and translationally follows further search tendencies, does our normal consciousness of fulfillment of E (L) become a *translation consciousness*.

In this regard, a "practical tendency" in the form of a "volitional tendency" is required, which goes beyond our normal meaning consciousness, the consciousness of *table*, and motivates the search for E' (L'), for "Tisch", in this consciousness. Especially since our meaning intention of E (L) is already fulfilled, the meaning is already recognized and our search for E' (L') must be pursued despite the completed fulfilment of the meaning intention of E (L). This tendency is itself an act that does not have a start and a foreseen end point like normal acts, but proves to be an act that extends over a "center point" and follows further acts. Husserl calls it "outward meaning" (*Hinausmeinen*) and names the act a "transient

act" (Husserl 2005: 175, 219). But is this practical volitional tendency in the sense of outward meaning the only tendency that is effective in establishing the second relationship in the translation process? How do we get from an already recognized object, which is also conscious with its corresponding expression in a thematic fulfillment consciousness, to another expression, which calls it something similar in another language?

As already mentioned, Husserl has spoken very often of the sign or the expression from which a tendency derives and tries to lead us to a meaning consciousness. However, this is difficult to accept both in a translation process and in the case where multiple names are assigned to a single object in a single language. Hence, the object is not to be understood as a simple object dealing with a single name, but as an object that can potentially be expressed by several terms. We see or think of a table, the act of cognition and identification recognizes the object as this particular object, but the object can have several names both intralinguistically and interlinguistically. It can be called "la table" (French) as well as "der Tisch" (German), or "miz" (Persian) or "altaawila" (Arabic) or "x", "y", etc. The same can happen in the situation where we recognize the object as a certain one, but the name that denotes it does not occur to us.

This is why we have to accept the need to consider the possibility that our consciousness receives tendencies from both the expression and the object, and to support the idea that the object also directs tendencies to our consciousness that affect our mode of attention to it. In this regard, Husserl particularly distinguishes between two modes of the attention tendency: first, a "factual" or "thematic" tendency, in which a "trait" comes from the object and draws us "for its own sake" (like a "loud whistle" that draws our attention due to its

volume). Second, a tendency that entails "appearing imagination" (*erscheinendes Vorstellen*), whereby we do not turn to the object for its own sake, but "for another sake" and what interests us lies somewhere else (like a loud beep sounding around us that indicates an event, e.g., a danger and the need for a reaction or the return to work, etc.). In this case, the object acts like a sign that indicates something else associatively (Husserl 2005: 210–12).

It seems that the meant object in the second part of the relationship is thematically conscious as such in our translation consciousness and consciousness receives from it an associative tendency intertwined with the practical volitional tendency, whereupon the object works as a medium of orienting our intention to E' (L'). Whether we can follow this associative tendency from the meant conscious object in a practical translation case is now a question. To answer this, we need a linguistic consciousness developed genetically and apperceptively, which will serve as the basis of the association. If we have this consciousness and follow the associative tendency deriving from the meant object and grasped by consciousness, then the equivalent of E (L), namely E' (L'), occurs to us. We then say: "'Table' is 'Tisch' in German". Or, conversely, we say: "I know this object, but was not aware that it is called 'Gewürznelken-Baum' in German". Or a Finn points to a fish in the market and asks me what it's called in English. I say I have no idea. The Finn says "suomeksi se on siika" ("in Finnish it's *siika*"), and I say "Oh, whitefish!"[9] Only after these two tendencies have been completed, a new act of cognition will be used to establish the second relationship. The new scheme can then be represented as follows:

9   I owe this example to Douglas Robinson.

Figure 7: Universal Model of the translation consciousness

There is not a totally split consciousnesses whose parts lie side by side, but the whole thing takes place in the unity of a single consciousness. Neither do we have a single consciousness in the sense of "everything is one" as Husserl emphasizes in *Draft Plan*. With the completion of the second part of the relationship, the process is formally completed in one direction. However, the fact that the second part of the relationship is completed with the arrival of the E' (L') does not mean that the translation process changes radically at this last stage if E' (L') does not exist. The translation process and its functioning in this phase of the process described so far is a *search process* that takes place with the described intentional structure in the search for E' (L'). If the E' (L') does not exist, the process remains open in the active search mode until our practical volitional tendency, with the arrival of (an) adequate or partially adequate E' (L')(s), is completely or partially satisfied and it thus completes the process, or in case it is not satisfied, we give up the search or we look for other solutions depending on the original translation intent.

7 The Double Intentionality of Translation Consciousness and its Specific Temporality

With the completion of the search process, we now have two originally separate fulfillments, which intentionally become a quasi-consciousness unity through the motivation of the volitional act that takes place in our translational search consciousness. On the one hand, we have the dynamic fulfillment of the E (L)-intention, of the "table"-intention, and on the other hand, the static fulfillment of the *E*-intention, of the *table*-intention, up to the idea of E' (L'), of the "Tisch". In addition to our practical volitional act, which connects the two parts of the translational process in our translation consciousness and creates a quasi-unity, we have a specific retentional and protentional consciousness. The specific retentionality and protentionality of the translation consciousness goes back to certain differences in temporality in relation to a normal retentional and protentional consciousness dealing with time-objects that are physically perceptible objects like a house or a piece of music.

We have in our translation consciousness a specific consciousness of translation which is protentional specifically due to the teleological transient pursuit of the E' (L'), in the sense that we are looking for E' (L') and this search opens a future horizon of linguistic possibilities that are each the subject of a translational determination. We are looking for "Tisch" as the equivalent of "table"—in this search consists the protentionality of translation consciousness. At the same time, as we will see shortly, while not actually a retentional consciousness in the narrow sense, the translation consciousness is retentional in the broad sense that: (1) We do not lose the E (L) entirely from sight, (2) the E (L) remains in a weak retention, (3) we consider E' (L') to be equivalent to E (L),

when it arrives, and (4) we attribute an E (L)-dependency to E' (L'). This state of affairs can be shown as follows:


Figure 8: Retentionality and protentionality of the translation consciousness

So the search for "Tisch" is not a mere search for the sake of "Tisch", but it is the search for "Tisch" as equivalent of "table", where "table", although not active but passive, is present in the form of a weak retention and allows us to immediately recognize "Tisch" as its equivalent once "Tisch" has occurred to us.

The *first* double intentionality of translation consciousness consists in the double intentionality inherent in this search process. We can therefore call it the *unidirectional search-specific double intentionality.* This search-specific double intentionality consists on the one hand of the "transverse intentionality" (*Querintentionalität*) of the search for the E' (L'), for the "Tisch", while the process from E (L) to E' (L'), from "table" to "Tisch", is taking place step by step with the weak retention of the E (L) and the strong protention of the E' (L') that we have at every moment in the course of translation. On the other hand, it consists of the "longitudinal intentionality" (*Längsintentionalität*) of the consciousness of this process as the consciousness of the completion of a translational whole as well as of the connection of E (L) and E' (L'), of the general consciousness of translation, the consciousness of self-involvement in the act of translating from "table" to "Tisch" and in the attempts that enable the establishment of the connection.

Figure 9: Unidirectional search-specific double intentionality

At this stage, such a quasi-unity of translation consciousness could sometimes produce translational evidence in the sense that we can say that E (L) and E' (L') are evidently equivalents. Sometimes, it could not. In the first place, the whole process in its flow from E (L) to E' (L') aims to call for possible E' (L')s in the sense of the location of appropriate equivalent(s) among E'_{1-n+1} (L'), which only provide temporary evidence in regard to the static fulfillment of the second part of the relationship. In other words, the completion of the static fulfillment of the second part of the relationship at most locates the E' (L')s or the alleged E' (L')s. Whether it is or these are evidently (an) appropriate equivalent(s) for E (L) and if so, to which extent it is or they are appropriate, i.e. how appropriate "Tisch" is as an equivalent for "table"—for that we need a higher level of verification act, a transient act of identification and cognition that goes through and beyond every part of the process; which means that a transversal synthesis and thus a new translational identification and conflict consciousness is required that allows us to compare directly the E (L) and E' (L'). This higher-level act of identification gives us translational evidence in the sense of an evident translational congru-

ence. This act is at the same time considered to be the motivation regulator that contributes to the saturation of practical search tendencies, following the establishment of a match and an evident identity between E (L) and incoming E' (L'). On the contrary case, it may lead us to a further search in the event of a mismatch or a non-identity.

The *second* double intentionality of translation consciousness, the *bidirectional verification-specific double intentionality*, occurs through the transversal act of identification. During the verification function wherein this act has to achieve an evident identity, we move back and forth several times between E (L) and E' (L'), between "table" and "Tisch". The direction in which the verification process takes place is therefore indifferent to this act. The bottom line is that all components are conscious this time: we now have two or more symbolic expressions that are supposedly and immanently connected with each other in a translational relationship through our thematic consciousness, in which the meaning or the meant object, *table*, stands as a connecting thematic link. The act can be aimed at E (L), "table", or at E' (L'), "Tisch". Since the first process in the direction from E (L) to E' (L') has taken place, the verification process can now run in the opposite direction, but does not have to.

In order to verify the correctness and the validity of this equivalence relationship, we must renew the identification process of both expressions in our translation consciousness. Due to the awareness of all components, it does not matter whether the intention in the renewal process begins with the dynamic or static relationship, i.e., whether the renewal process is centrifugal (from the meaning or meant object to the expressions, from *table* to "table" and/or "Tisch") or centripetal (from the expressions to the meaning or meant object, from "table" and/or "Tisch" to *table*). In both cases, an

intention is aimed at E' (L') (at "table" for example), while another intention is subliminally aimed at E (L) (at "Tisch") and keeps it fulfilled and close in living memory.

The second double intentionality of our translation consciousness consists in the dyadic aiming of the verifying act of identification at two different linguistic unities. The renewed verification processes of both expressions, which run in different directions despite the completion of the first translation process and the conscious presence of the necessary components, serve to enrich the thematic synthesis and thus to nourish our translation consciousness in order to verify the degree of consistency and identity most closely and to produce a translational evidence, so that we know whether and to what extent "Tisch" as the equivalent of "table" is in fact appropriate. We now have a bidirectional transverse intentionality and a longitudinal intentionality, and both contribute to the consciousness of the synthesis and its improvement up to the evidence. This new state of affairs can be shown as follows:

Translation
Consciousness

$$E\ (L) \longleftrightarrow E'_1\ (L')$$
$$E\ (L) \longleftrightarrow E'_2\ (L')$$
$$E\ (L) \longleftrightarrow E'_{n+1}\ (L')$$

Search for Evidence

Figure 10: Bidirectional verification-specific double intentionality

Although the E (L) remains in a weak retention in the original translational search process until the E' (L') has arrived, and although, in the verifying identification process, the E (L) and the E' (L') keep each other retentionally connected to verify the evidence of the equivalence, it does not imply that we are

dealing with an ordinary retentional consciousness in our translation consciousness. It is obvious that our operating consciousness of translation is a translational now-consciousness, which retentionally maintains its quasi-originary impression, namely E (L) or E' (L'), in primary memory in the course of the original search process as well as of the verifying process. We perceive the word "table": we hear or read it. The perception of the word "table" constitutes in our translation consciousness a linguistic "consciousness of what has just happened". In other words, "what has just happened" is the perception not of a physical but of a linguistic object, of *table*. However, the "intensity" of what has just happened in the "continuity" of the translation process does not decrease, as it does in a normal retentional consciousness of physical time objects (cf. Husserl 1985: 31–32). This is because the practical volitional act on the one hand and the verifying act of identification on the other keep the intensity of the retention equal until the arrival of the E' (L') in the search process and until the establishment of the evidence of the equivalence relationship in the verification process. And we do not have any regular modification in the sense of constant substitution of a now-consciousness with another or in the sense of its constant transition in the consciousness of what just happened as is the case, as I said, in a normal retentional consciousness of physical time objects.

The horizon that we first have in the translation process is not an authentically "living" horizon, which, as Husserl describes it (ibid.: 43), is supposed to constitute retention in the perception of a time object. It is inauthentically kept alive through our translational motivation that reflects in the volitional act and in the verification act, in the will to find with evidence the equivalent for "table". This original horizon, which is characterized by weak retention and strong proten-

tion in the search process, becomes a circular or zigzag running horizon in the verification process, which, in its entirety, has in turn its own retentional and protentional horizon not in the conventional sense of an object perception, but in the specific sense of a translational constitution. On the one hand, the specific temporal structure of translation consciousness is due to the specific structure of the translation process, which I described in detail above. On the other hand, it harks back to the fact that the object of our translation consciousness is not a "thing", not a "time object", nor an "objective-time being", but rather a translation specific "affair-complex" (*Sachverhalt*), that ultimately has the form of the judgment *E (L) is E′ (L′)*, *Table is Tisch.*

Judgment, as Husserl claims, is neither presentation nor representation. According to Husserl, judging itself can take more or less time; it has its extension in subjective time and can be presented or represented. What is judged, on the contrary, is not long or short, continuous or less continuous. In other words, the judgment in the sense of judging can be represented, but what is judged cannot, since it is not an "genuine givenness" in the sense of an "individual being" that has a "continuity of appearances" (Husserl 1985: 96-98, 130-134). The translational judgment process ultimately strives for the evidence of the judgment *E (L) is E′ (L′),* for the evidence of *Table is Tisch.* Regardless of how evident and how true it is, the judgment *Table is Tisch* has about it nothing temporal per se. But the process in which the judgment comes about is temporal just like any other judgment process. That the translation-specific judgment process of the judgment *Table is Tisch* is just as temporal as any other judgment process of a monolingual judgment like *E (L) is q* (*The table is practical*) or *E′ (L′) is q′* (*Der Tisch ist praktisch*), does that mean that the three judgments (1) *The table is practical*, (2) *Der Tisch ist praktisch* and (3)

Table is Tisch have the same temporality structures? Especially because the three judgments have the same apophantic structure?

The translation-specific judgment *Table is Tisch* has its own temporal specificities due to the complex structure of the translation consciousness in its two variants, i.e. in search consciousness (weak retention and strong protention) and in verification consciousness (circular or zigzag running horizon with its own retentional and protentional horizon). These specificities are not found in a normal language consciousness with its own genesis and its own apperception structure. The temporal structure of the judgment process of the judgment *Table is Tisch* as the process of a translation-specific judgment formation deviates not only from the temporality of a perceptual object in terms of double intentionality, but also from the temporality of any monolingual judgment about the same perceptual object in the form of *The table is practical* or *Der Tisch ist praktisch*. It is about the *temporality of the translation-specific double intentionality of translation consciousness* in the translation of a nominal expression, the translation of "table".

8 Closing remarks

The way the double intentionality of translation consciousness works, however, shows certain differences in the translation of a sentence compared to the translation of a nominal expression, just as the intentional structure of translation consciousness itself and its act mechanism show certain differences in the transition from a nominal expression to a sentence. The previous explanations have shown the structure of the double intentionality in the translation process of a nominal expression. What complications this structure takes

when translating a synthetic-syntactic form that gives expression to an affair-complex, and how the temporal basis of this structure is organized, has to be analyzed in further investigations.

In memory of my father

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